Authors:
Jiahao Cai
;
Zihao Wei
;
Yingjie Zhang
;
Siwei Sun
and
Lei Hu
Affiliation:
State Key Laboratory of Information Security, Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences, China, Data Assurance and Communication Security Research Center, Chinese Academy of Sciences, China, School of Cyber Security, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences and China
Keyword(s):
GIMLI, Integral, Division Property, Zero-sum, Degree evaluation, MILP.
Related
Ontology
Subjects/Areas/Topics:
Computer-Supported Education
;
Enterprise Information Systems
;
Information Systems Analysis and Specification
;
Information Technologies Supporting Learning
;
Security
;
Security and Privacy
Abstract:
GIMLI is a 384-bit permutation proposed by Bernstein et al. at CHES 2017. It is designed with the goal of achieving both high security and high performance across a wide range of hardware and software platforms. Since GIMLI can be used as a building block for many cryptographic schemes, it is important to understand its concrete security. To the best of our knowledge, third party cryptanalysis of GIMLI is limited. In this paper, we identify some zero-sum distinguishers for 14-round GIMLI with the inside-out technique, which are one-round longer than the integral distinguishers presented by the designers. Although we obtain improved cryptanalysis results, these zero-sum distinguishers are far from threatening the full version of GIMLI.