Abstract
Seven proposed accounts of epistemic possibility are criticized, and a new account is proposed, making use of the notion of having justification for dismissing a proposition. The new account explains intuitions about otherwise puzzling cases, upholds plausible general principles about epistemic possibility, and explains the practical import of epistemic modality judgements. It is suggested that judgements about epistemic possibility function to assess which propositions are worthy of further inquiry.
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Huemer, M. Epistemic Possibility. Synthese 156, 119–142 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-005-4782-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-005-4782-8