Notes
Versions of contextualism are developed in [9, 33, 62], and [53]. Kratzer’s analysis further restricts the domain of quantification to the closest worlds in the modal base, to be determined by a contextually provided ordering source, but this matter of detail need not detain us here. See [41] for an up-to-date discussion of her views.
Veltman’s original update rule for conjunction differs in that it treats conjunction as internally static: updating i with a ⌜ϕ ∧ ψ⌝ amounts to taking the intersection of i[ϕ] and i[ψ]. This difference need not detain us here.
Update semantics also predicts that embedding an epistemic modal under another epistemic modal has no interesting semantic effects. A careful analysis of this prediction must be left to another day but see [49] for critical discussion.
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Acknowledgments
For comments and discussion, I would like to thank Chris Kennedy, Peter Klecha, Seth Yalcin, and the participants of the University of Chicago Workshop in Semantics and Philosophy of Language.
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Willer, M. An Update on Epistemic Modals. J Philos Logic 44, 835–849 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-015-9364-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-015-9364-8