Abstract.
The problem of allocating a single indivisible unit to one of several agents is considered, where monetary compensations are not allowed, and the unit is not necessarily desirable to each agent. In addition to strategyproofness, three properties of social choice functions are considered: Pareto-optimality, nondictatorship, and nonbossiness. It is shown that these three additional criteria cannot be satisfied simultaneously. However, any two of the additional criteria can be satisfied. We give characterizations of the classes of strategyproof social choice functions satisfying these three pairs of properties.
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Received: 18 February 1998/Accepted: 15 May 2000
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Pápai, S. Strategyproof single unit award rules. Soc Choice Welfare 18, 785–798 (2001). https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550000084
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550000084