Abstract
We prove a lemma characterizing majority preferences over lotteries on a subset of Euclidean space. Assuming voters have quadratic von Neumann–Morgenstern utility representations, and assuming existence of a majority undominated (or “core”) point, the core voter is decisive: one lottery is majority-preferred to another if and only if this is the preference of the core voter. Several applications of this result to dynamic voting games are discussed.
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This paper was completed after Jeff Banks’s death. John Duggan is deeply indebted to him for his friendship and his collaboration on this and many other projects.
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Banks, J.S., Duggan, J. A Social Choice Lemma on Voting Over Lotteries with Applications to a Class of Dynamic Games. Soc Choice Welfare 26, 285–304 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0090-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0090-6