Abstract
We study cost allocation problem arising from less-than-truckload collaboration among perishable product retailers. The relevant costs we consider include fixed transportation cost, variable transportation cost, and decay loss of perishable products. Cooperative game theory is applied to study this cost allocation problem. The corresponding cooperative game, called transportation facility choice game, is established. First, we show that the core of the transportation facility choice game is non-empty. Then, we identify some conditions for concavity and quasi-concavity of the transportation facility choice game with the linear decay and negative exponential decay functions, respectively. Finally, simulation is conducted to analyze how optimal solutions differ under the linear decay and exponential decay functions, and intuitive cost allocation schemes are proposed and compared with the \(\tau \)-value and the Shapley value of the corresponding game. Simulation results show that the optimal solution under linear decay function tends to choose facilities with higher fixed cost than that under exponential decay function. Additionally, among all the cost allocation schemes compared, the simple cost allocation scheme called A-IM, the \(\tau \)-value, and the Shapley value have better performance in terms of the percentage of allocations lying in the core.
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Acknowledgments
The authors thank the associate editor and the referees for their insightful comments and suggestions. They helped the authors improve both the content and exposition of this work. The authors also express their gratitude to Mr. Zhuhui for his help on simulation. This work was supported by Major Program of the National Natural Science Foundation of China (71490725, 71490722) and Program of the National Natural Science Foundation of China (71271178).
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Appendices
Appendix 1: Proof of Proposition 3
Proof
For notational convenience, in this proof we use c(S) to denote \(c_{L}(S)\) (that is, the subscript are omitted). Other notions are simplified similarly. If \(c(S)=\underset{k\in F}{\min }c(S)_{k}\), then \(c(S)=\underset{k\in F}{\min }\left\{ f_{k}+\underset{j\in S}{\sum }a_{k} d_jq_{j}+\underset{j\in S}{\sum }t_{k}d_j\theta _{j}q_{j}\right\} \). Let \(f^{S}\), \(a^{S}\) and \(t^{S}\) be the fixed cost, unit variable cost and traveling time per unit traveling distance corresponding to c(S) , respectively. Then,
(1) For \(i,j\in N\), we have \(c(\{i\})=\underset{k\in F}{\min }\left\{ f_{k}+a_{k}d_iq_{i}+t_{k}d_i\theta _{i}q_{i}\right\} =f^{\{i\}}+a^{\{i\}}d_iq_{i} +t^{\{i\}}d_i\theta _{i}q_{i}\). Similarly \(c(\{j\})=f^{\{j\}}+a^{\{j\}}d_jq_{j}+t^{\{j\}}d_j\theta _{j}q_{j}\). Let \(c(S)_{W}\) be the total cost for coalition S when W is the optimal set of facilities used by coalition S. Then
and
Thus,
If \(f_i\theta _{\min }\delta \ge a_i\), then \(\delta d_j\theta _{j}q_{j}-a^{\{j\}}d_jq_{j}/f^{\{j\}}\ge 0\), and \(\delta d_i\theta _{i}q_{i}-a^{\{i\}}d_iq_{i}/f^{\{i\}}\ge 0\).
If \(f^{\{i\}}\ge f^{\{j\}}\), we have \(c(\{i,j\})_{^{\{i\}}}-c(\{i\})-c(\{j\})\le -f^{\{j\}}<0\); otherwise \(c(\{i,j\})_{\{j\}}-c(\{i\})-c(\{j\})\le -f^{\{i\}}<0\).
If \(f_i\theta _{\max }\delta \le a_i\), then \(\delta d_j\theta _{j}q_{j} -a^{\{j\}}d_jq_{j}/f^{\{j\}}\le 0\), and \(\delta d_i\theta _{i}q_{i}-a^{\{i\}}d_iq_{i}/f^{\{i\}}\le 0\).
If \(f^{\{i\}}\le f^{\{j\}}\), then \(c(\{i,j\})_{\{i\}}-c(\{i\})-c(\{j\})\le -f^{\{j\}}<0\); otherwise \(c(\{i,j\})_{^{\{j\}}}-c(\{i\})-c(\{j\})\le -f^{\{i\}}<0\).
Given that at least one inequality is less than 0, \(\min \left\{ c(\{i,j\})_{\{i\}},c(\{i,j\})_{\{j\}}\right\} <c(\{i\})+c(\{j\})\), so \(c(\{i,j\})=\underset{_{k\in F}}{\min }c(\{i,j\})_{k}\).
(2) For \(S,T\in N\), and \(S\cap T=\emptyset \), let \(S\cup T=ST\), and suppose that \(c(S)=\underset{k\in F}{\min }c(S)_{k}\) on the set S and T. We then arrive at
Note that \(\underset{_{k\in F}}{\min }~c(S\cup T)_{k}\le f^{S}+t^{S}\underset{j\in S\cup T}{\sum }d_j\theta _{j}q_{j}+a^{S}\underset{j\in S\cup T}{\sum }d_jq_{j} \), and \(\underset{_{k\in F} }{\min }~c(S\cup T)_{k}\le f^{T}+t^{T}\underset{j\in S\cup T}{\sum }d_j\theta _{j}q_{j} +a^{T}\underset{j\in S\cup T}{\sum }d_jq_{j} \). Let \(c(S,T)=\underset{_{k\in F}}{\min }~c(S\cup T)_{k}-c(S)-c(T)\). Thus, we have
Combining Condition A and Condition B with (A.1) and (A.2), respectively, we can obtain
When \(f_i\theta _{\min }\delta \ge a_i\), we have \(\underset{j\in S}{\sum } \delta d_j\theta _{j}q_{j}-\underset{j\in S}{\sum }\frac{a^Sd_jq_{j}}{f^S}\ge 0\) and \(\underset{j\in T}{\sum }\delta d_j\theta _{j}q_{j}-\underset{j\in T}{\sum }\frac{a^Td_jq_{j}}{f^T}\ge 0\). Furthermore, if \(f^{S}\ge f^{T}\), then it follows from (A.4) that \(c(S,T)\le -f^{T}<0\); otherwise, \(c(S,T)\le -f^{S}<0\). Thus, \(c(S,T)<0\).
When \(f_i\theta _{\max }\delta \le a_i\), we have \(\underset{j\in S}{\sum }\delta d_j\theta _{j}q_{j}-\underset{j\in S}{\sum } \frac{a^Sd_jq_{j}}{f^S}\le 0\) and \(\underset{j\in S}{\sum }\delta d_j\theta _{j}q_{j}-\underset{j\in S}{\sum }\frac{a^Sd_jq_{j}}{f^S}\le 0\). Furthermore, if \(f^{S}\ge f^{T}\), then it follows from (A.3) that \(c(S,T)\le -f^{S}<0\); otherwise, \(c(S,T)\le -f^{T}<0\). Thus, \(c(S,T)<0\).
From the analysis above, we have \(\underset{_{k\in F}}{\min }c(S\cup T)_{k}<c(S)+c(T) \).
Given that
we have \(c(S\cup T)=\underset{k\in F}{\min }c(S\cup T)_{k}\).
(3) From (1), we know for \(S,T\in N\), and \(S\cap T=\emptyset \), \(\left| S\cup T\right| =2\), and so \(c(S\cup T)=\underset{k\in F}{\min }c(S\cup T)_{k}\). From (2), we know if \(\left| S\cup T\right| \le 3\), then \(c(S\cup T)=\underset{k\in F}{\min }c(S\cup T)_{k}\). It can be derived similarly that \(c(S\cup T)=\underset{k\in F}{\min }c(S\cup T)_{k}\), for all \(S\in N\). \(\square \)
Appendix 2: Proof of Proposition 5
Proof
For \(l\notin S\subset T\subseteq N\), let \(h(S,\{l\})=c(S\cup \{l\})-c(S)\). Then,
Since
and
we have
Similarly, we can show that
Therefore,
Furthermore,
Given that
and
we have
Combining Condition A and Condition B with (A.5) and (A.6), respectively, we obtain
When \(f_i\theta _{\min }\delta \ge a_i\), we have \(\delta d_l\theta _{l}q_{l}-\frac{a^Td_lq_{l}}{f^T}\ge 0\) and \(\underset{j\in T-S}{\sum }\delta d_j\theta _{j}q_{j}-\underset{j\in T-S}{\sum }\frac{a^{S\cup \{l\}}d_jq_{j}}{f^{S\cup \{l\}}}\ge 0\). Furthermore if \(f^{S\cup \{l\}}\le f^{T}\), then from (A.7) we have \(h(S,l)-h(T,l)\ge 0\); otherwise from (A.8) we get \(h(S,l)-h(T,l)\ge 0\).
When \(f_i\theta _{\max }\delta \le a_i\), we have \(\delta d_l\theta _{l}q_{l} -\frac{a^Td_lq_{l}}{f^T}\le 0\) and \(\underset{j\in T-S}{\sum }\delta d_j\theta _{j} q_{j}-\underset{j\in T-S}{\sum }\frac{a^{S\cup \{l\}}d_jq_{j}}{f^{S\cup \{l\}}}\le 0\). Furthermore if \(f^{S\cup \{l\}}\le f^{T}\), from (A.8) we have \(h(S,l)-h(T,l)\ge 0\); otherwise from (A.7) we have \(h(S,l)-h(T,l)\ge 0\).
The analysis above shows that \(c(S\cup \{l\})-c(S)\ge c(T\cup \{l\})-c(T)\). This establishes the concavity of the game \((N,c_{L})\). \(\square \)
Appendix 3: Proof of Proposition 7
Proof
Suppose that \(c_{E}(S)=\underset{k\in F}{\min }c_{E}(S)_{k}\) on the set S, T (\(S,T\subset N\)). For notational convenience, in this proof use c(S) to denote \(c_{E}(S)\) (other notations are simplified in a similar way). For \(S,T\subset N\), and \(S\cap T=\emptyset \), we have
and
Given that
and
then
and
If \(t^{T}\ge t^{S}\), then it follows from Lemma 1 that
From (A.9), we have
Combining with Condition B, we have
If \(t^{T}<t^{S}\), then it follows from Lemma 1 that
From (A.10), we have
Combining with Condition B, we have
Given that
then
and
Therefore \(c(S,T)<0\). When \(t^{T}\ge t^{S}\), from (A.11), we have \(c(S,T)<0\). Otherwise, (A.12) yields \(c(S,T)\le -f^{T}<0\). Similar to the proof of Proposition 3, we can prove \(c(S)=\underset{k\in F}{\min }c(S)_{k}\), for all \(S\in N\). \(\square \)
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Li, J., Cai, X. & Zeng, Y. Cost allocation for less-than-truckload collaboration among perishable product retailers. OR Spectrum 38, 81–117 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00291-015-0424-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00291-015-0424-9