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Denying the content–vehicle distinction: a response to ‘The New Mind Revisited’

  • 25TH ANNIVERSARY VOLUME A FAUSTIAN EXCHANGE: WHAT IS IT TO BE HUMAN IN THE ERA OF UBIQUITOUS TECHNOLOGY?
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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Institute of Consumption, Communication and Behavior, IULM University, Via Carlo Bo, 8, 16033, Milan, Italy

    Riccardo Manzotti

  2. Cardiff School of Art & Design, Howard Gardens, Cardiff, CF24 0SP, UK

    Robert Pepperell

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  1. Riccardo Manzotti
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  2. Robert Pepperell
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Correspondence to Robert Pepperell.

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Manzotti, R., Pepperell, R. Denying the content–vehicle distinction: a response to ‘The New Mind Revisited’. AI & Soc 28, 467–470 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00146-013-0455-1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00146-013-0455-1

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