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Some Propositions of Approaches for Measuring Indirect Control Power of Firms and Mutual Connections in Corporate Shareholding Structures

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Transactions on Computational Collective Intelligence XXXV

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((TCCI,volume 12330))

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Abstract

This paper discusses some game-theoretical methods that use power indices for measuring the indirect control power of firms and mutual connections in complex corporate shareholding networks. Only a few of the methods considered in the literature so far measure the control power of all firms involved in shareholding networks; meanwhile, none of them regard measuring the importance of linkages. The intention of this article is first to propose a modification of the Mercik-Łobos and Mercik-Stach methods using the Banzhaf index to measure the direct and indirect control of investors and stock companies. Second, having already estimated the control power of nodes (firms) in a network, we consider the relationship of this power to the power of the linkages that connect the companies in directed networks. Then, we present our own idea of how such link’s power can be measured. We regard to the power of the link in relation to the firms as well as (more significantly) in relation to the entire corporate network.

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Acknowledgements

This research is financed by the following funds: “Subsidy for maintenance and development of research potential” (No. 16.16.200.396) of AGH University of Science and Technology, MUR, research grants from the University of Bergamo, and research funds from WSB University in Wroclaw.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. AGH University of Science and Technology, Al. Mickiewicza 30, 30-059, Krakow, Poland

    Izabella Stach

  2. WSB University in Wroclaw, Fabryczna 29/31, 53-609, Wroclaw, Poland

    Jacek Mercik

  3. Department of Management, Economics, and Quantitative Methods, University of Bergamo, Via dei Caniana, 2, 24127, Bergamo, Italy

    Cesarino Bertini

Authors
  1. Izabella Stach
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  2. Jacek Mercik
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  3. Cesarino Bertini
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Correspondence to Izabella Stach .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Information Systems, Wroclaw University of Science and Technology, Wroclaw, Poland

    Ngoc Thanh Nguyen

  2. Faculty of Information and Communication Technologies, Swinburne University of Technology, Hawthorn, VIC, Australia

    Ryszard Kowalczyk

  3. WSB University in Wroclaw, Wroclaw, Poland

    Jacek Mercik

  4. WSB University in Wroclaw, Wroclaw, Poland

    Anna Motylska-Kuźma

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Stach, I., Mercik, J., Bertini, C. (2020). Some Propositions of Approaches for Measuring Indirect Control Power of Firms and Mutual Connections in Corporate Shareholding Structures. In: Nguyen, N.T., Kowalczyk, R., Mercik, J., Motylska-Kuźma, A. (eds) Transactions on Computational Collective Intelligence XXXV. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 12330. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-62245-2_8

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-62245-2_8

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