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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNTCS,volume 8477))

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Abstract

Physical means of securing information, such as sealed envelopes and scratch cards, can be used to achieve cryptographic objectives. Reasoning about this has so far been informal.

We give a model of distinguishable sealed envelopes in Z, exploring design decisions and further analysis and development of such models.

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Boiten, E., Jacob, J. (2014). Sealed Containers in Z. In: Ait Ameur, Y., Schewe, KD. (eds) Abstract State Machines, Alloy, B, TLA, VDM, and Z. ABZ 2014. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 8477. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-43652-3_12

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-43652-3_12

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-662-43651-6

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-662-43652-3

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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