Abstract
This paper presents the enforcement of control flow policies for Java bytecode dedicated to open and constrained devices. On-device enforcement of security policies mostly relies on run-time monitoring or inline checking code, which is not appropriate for strongly constrained devices such as mobile phones and smart-cards. We present a proof-carrying code approach with on-device lightweight verification of control flow policies statically at loading-time. Our approach is suitable for evolving, open and constrained Java-based systems as it is compositional, to avoid re-verification of already verified bytecode upon loading of new bytecode, and it is regressive, to cleanly support bytecode unloading.
This work is supported by the EU-FET-IP-SECURECHANGE project.
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Fontaine, A., Hym, S., Simplot-Ryl, I. (2012). Verifiable Control Flow Policies for Java Bytecode. In: Barthe, G., Datta, A., Etalle, S. (eds) Formal Aspects of Security and Trust. FAST 2011. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7140. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-29420-4_8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-29420-4_8
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