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XMSS - A Practical Forward Secure Signature Scheme Based on Minimal Security Assumptions

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Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQCrypto 2011)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 7071))

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Abstract

We present the hash-based signature scheme XMSS. It is the first provably (forward) secure and practical signature scheme with minimal security requirements: a pseudorandom and a second preimage resistant (hash) function family. Its signature size is reduced to less than 25% compared to the best provably secure hash based signature scheme.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Cryptography and Computeralgebra Department of Computer Science, TU Darmstadt, Germany

    Johannes Buchmann, Erik Dahmen & Andreas Hülsing

Authors
  1. Johannes Buchmann
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  2. Erik Dahmen
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  3. Andreas Hülsing
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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan

    Bo-Yin Yang

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Buchmann, J., Dahmen, E., Hülsing, A. (2011). XMSS - A Practical Forward Secure Signature Scheme Based on Minimal Security Assumptions. In: Yang, BY. (eds) Post-Quantum Cryptography. PQCrypto 2011. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7071. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-25405-5_8

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-25405-5_8

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-25404-8

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-25405-5

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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