Abstract
We study the problem of designing truthful algorithms for scheduling a set of tasks, each one owned by a selfish agent, to a set of parallel (identical or unrelated) machines in order to minimize the makespan. We consider the following process: at first the agents declare the length of their tasks, then given these bids the protocol schedules the tasks on the machines. The aim of the protocol is to minimize the makespan, i.e. the maximal completion time of the tasks, while the objective of each agent is to minimize the completion time of its task and thus an agent may lie if by doing so, his task may finish earlier. In this paper, we show the existence of randomized truthful (non-polynomial-time) algorithms with expected approximation ratio equal to 3/2 for different scheduling settings (identical machines with and without release dates and unrelated machines) and models of execution (strong or weak). Our result improves the best previously known result [1] for the problem with identical machines (P||C max ) in the strong model of execution and reaches, asymptotically, the lower bound of [5]. In addition, this result can be transformed to a polynomial-time truthful randomized algorithm with expected approximation ratio 3/2 + ε (resp. \(\frac{11}{6}-\frac{1}{3m}\)) for Pm||C max (resp. P||C max ).
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Angel, E., Bampis, E., Pascual, F.: Truthful algorithms for scheduling selfish tasks on parallel machines. Theoretical Computer Science (short version in WINE 2005) 369, 157–168 (2006); In: Deng, X., Ye, Y. (eds.) WINE 2005. LNCS, vol. 3828, pp. 698–707. Springer, Heidelberg (2005)
Angel, E., Bampis, E., Pascual, F., Tchetgnia, A.: On truthfulness and approximation for scheduling selfish tasks. Journal of Scheduling (2009), 10.2007/s10951-009-0118-8
Auletta, V., De Prisco, R., Penna, P., Persiano, P.: How to route and tax selfish unsplittable traffic. In: 16th ACM Symposium on Parallelism in Algorithms and Architectures, pp. 196–204 (June 2004)
Mueller, R., Heydenreich, B., Uetz, M.: Games and mechanism design in machine scheduling - an introduction. Research Memoranda 022, Maastricht: METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (2006)
Christodoulou, G., Gourvès, L., Pascual, F.: Scheduling selfish tasks: About the performance of truthful algorithms. In: Lin, G. (ed.) COCOON 2007. LNCS, vol. 4598, pp. 187–197. Springer, Heidelberg (2007)
Christodoulou, G., Koutsoupias, E., Nanavati, A.: Coordination mechanisms. In: Díaz, J., Karhumäki, J., Lepistö, A., Sannella, D. (eds.) ICALP 2004. LNCS, vol. 3142, pp. 345–357. Springer, Heidelberg (2004)
Graham, R.L.: Bounds for certain multiprocessing anomalies. Bell System Tech. 45, 1563 (1966)
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2010 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this paper
Cite this paper
Angel, E., Bampis, E., Thibault, N. (2010). Randomized Truthful Algorithms for Scheduling Selfish Tasks on Parallel Machines. In: López-Ortiz, A. (eds) LATIN 2010: Theoretical Informatics. LATIN 2010. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 6034. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-12200-2_5
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-12200-2_5
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-12199-9
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-12200-2
eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)