Abstract
We introduce a new traffic analysis attack: the Two-sided Statistical Disclosure Attack, that tries to uncover the receivers of messages sent through an anonymizing network supporting anonymous replies. We provide an abstract model of an anonymity system with users that reply to messages. Based on this model, we propose a linear approximation describing the likely receivers of sent messages. Using simulations, we evaluate the new attack given different traffic characteristics and we show that it is superior to previous attacks when replies are routed in the system.
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Danezis, G., Diaz, C., Troncoso, C. (2007). Two-Sided Statistical Disclosure Attack. In: Borisov, N., Golle, P. (eds) Privacy Enhancing Technologies. PET 2007. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 4776. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-75551-7_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-75551-7_3
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-75550-0
Online ISBN: 978-3-540-75551-7
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