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Strategyproof Mechanisms for Additively Separable Hedonic Games and Fractional Hedonic Games

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Approximation and Online Algorithms (WAOA 2017)

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Abstract

Additively separable hedonic games and fractional hedonic games have received considerable attention. These are coalition forming games of selfish agents based on their mutual preferences. Most of the work in the literature characterizes the existence and structure of stable outcomes (i.e., partitions in coalitions), assuming that preferences are given. However, there is little discussion on this assumption. In fact, agents receive different utilities if they belong to different partitions, and thus it is natural for them to declare their preferences strategically in order to maximize their benefit. In this paper we consider strategyproof mechanisms for additively separable hedonic games and fractional hedonic games, that is, partitioning methods without payments such that utility maximizing agents have no incentive to lie about their true preferences. We focus on social welfare maximization and provide several lower and upper bounds on the performance achievable by strategyproof mechanisms for general and specific additive functions. In most of the cases we provide tight or asymptotically tight results. All our mechanisms are simple and can be computed in polynomial time. Moreover, all the lower bounds are unconditional, that is, they do not rely on any computational or complexity assumptions.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. GSSI Institute, University of L’Aquila, L’Aquila, Italy

    Michele Flammini

  2. University of L’Aquila, L’Aquila, Italy

    Gianpiero Monaco

  3. Sapienza University of Rome, Rome, Italy

    Qiang Zhang

Authors
  1. Michele Flammini
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  2. Gianpiero Monaco
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  3. Qiang Zhang
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Gianpiero Monaco .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. The University of Western Ontario, London, Ontario, Canada

    Roberto Solis-Oba

  2. German University of Technology in Oman, Muscat, Oman

    Rudolf Fleischer

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Flammini, M., Monaco, G., Zhang, Q. (2018). Strategyproof Mechanisms for Additively Separable Hedonic Games and Fractional Hedonic Games. In: Solis-Oba, R., Fleischer, R. (eds) Approximation and Online Algorithms. WAOA 2017. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 10787. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-89441-6_22

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-89441-6_22

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