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Fast Oblivious AES A Dedicated Application of the MiniMac Protocol

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Progress in Cryptology – AFRICACRYPT 2016 (AFRICACRYPT 2016)

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Abstract

We present actively secure multi-party computation of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). To the best of our knowledge it is the fastest of its kind to date. We start from an efficient actively secure evaluation of general binary circuits that was implemented by the authors of [DLT14]. They presented an optimized implementation of the so-called MiniMac protocol [DZ13] that runs in the pre-processing model, and applied this to a binary AES circuit. In this paper we describe how to dedicate the pre-processing to the structure of AES, which improves significantly the throughput and latency of previous actively secure implementations. We get a latency of about 6 ms and amortised time about 0.4 ms per AES block, which seems completely adequate for practical applications such as verification of 1-time passwords.

R. Zakarias—The authors acknowledge support from the Danish National Research Foundation and The National Science Foundation of China (under the grant 61061130540) for the Sino-Danish Center for the Theory of Interactive Computation, within part of this work was performed; and from the CFEM research center, supported by the Danish Strategic Research Council.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    The concrete specifications of our experimental setup can be found in Appendix A.

  2. 2.

    Available at http://tinyurl.com/q2dmcuw.

  3. 3.

    Actually, the players in MiniMac have additive shares of the vectors and a special type of MACs are used to prevent cheating, but these details are not important here.

  4. 4.

    Note that when we say an entry in the table is a MiniMac representation of some vector this actually means that players have additive shares of that vector as well as some MACs and corresponding keys, however, the details of this are not important here.

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Authors and Affiliations

Authors

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Correspondence to Rasmus Zakarias .

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A Reproducing our results with the implementation

A Reproducing our results with the implementation

Getting the code

The implementation of our work can be found on GitHub at http://tinyurl.com/qbx99jv

Requirements

  • AutoMake 1.15

  • Bash 3.2 or later

  • Reasonable GCC compiler supporting C99 (or Windows SDK Visual Studio 2013 or later).

Building on Windows IA64

Install Visual Studio 2013 and open the solution file in miniapps/ dedicatedaes/winx64/daestest.sln. Press F7 in the x64-release build configuration to build the code. We have experienced problems with many small allocations on Windows making the malloc and free implementation on this system degenerate in performance.

Building on Linux and OSX

To build the code type ./build.sh release or ./build.sh debug depending on which configuration you want. To reproduce the performance numbers reported in the paper please build in the release configuration.

Generating pre-processing material for testing

Running the program with command line arguments -prep will generate the default set of preprocessing material needed to compute one block of ciphertext. ./miniapps/dedicatedaes/linux/src/cheetah -prep or on windows setting the command-line arguments and pressing F5. Alternatively the windows .exe file can be located in miniapps/dedicatedaes/winx64/daestest/Debug/ daestest.exe.

Running the protocol

Running the program with -mpc -prepfile  <filename> will make the process given aes preprocessing material file for player zero listen and wait for the other players to connect.

E.g. for two players

cheetah -mpc -prepfile ./aes_prep_4_player_0.rep will start the listening peer listening on all interfaces port 2020. While cheetah -mpc -prepfile ./aes_prep_4_player_1.rep -ip xxx.yyy.zzz.www -port 2020 will connect to a peer at ip-address xxx.yyy.zzz.www on port 2020.

Our experimental setup

The lab computers used for our experiments are interconnected by a 1 Gigabit LAN with the specifications below.

figure b

We emphasize that our implementation carries out the computational steps of the protocol single threaded.

The implementation does use additional threads for receiving and sending network messages. In this way the computational thread is as independent of network delays as the protocol allows. More precisely, the concrete interleaving of sending and receiving messages does not effect computational progress unless data from other parties are strictly required for the protocol to continue.

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Damgård, I., Zakarias, R. (2016). Fast Oblivious AES A Dedicated Application of the MiniMac Protocol. In: Pointcheval, D., Nitaj, A., Rachidi, T. (eds) Progress in Cryptology – AFRICACRYPT 2016. AFRICACRYPT 2016. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 9646. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-31517-1_13

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-31517-1_13

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