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On a Simple Game Theoretical Equivalence of Voting Majority Games with Vetoes of First and Second Degrees

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Intelligent Information and Database Systems (ACIIDS 2015)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNAI,volume 9011))

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Abstract

Introducing a veto into the process of group decision making (voting, aggregating preferences) drastically changes the position of decision makers and, consequently, it changes their power index. In this paper we derive the Shapley-Shubik and Penrose-Banzhaf indices for a class of voting games with vetoes. We also present a way of constructing a simple voting game which is equivalent to a game with vetoes of first degree. This simplifies the calculation of power indices by allowing us to use standard algorithms which are available online.

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References

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  3. Mercik, J.W.: Classification of committees with vetoes and conditions for the stability of power indices. Neurocomputing Part C 149, 1143–1148 (2015)

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Correspondence to Jacek Mercik .

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Mercik, J., Ramsey, D. (2015). On a Simple Game Theoretical Equivalence of Voting Majority Games with Vetoes of First and Second Degrees. In: Nguyen, N., Trawiński, B., Kosala, R. (eds) Intelligent Information and Database Systems. ACIIDS 2015. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 9011. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-15702-3_28

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-15702-3_28

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-15701-6

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-15702-3

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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