Abstract
In this paper, the characterization of the joint distribution of random set vectors by the belief function is investigated and the joint game in terms of the characteristic function is given. The bivariate Shapley value of a joint cooperative game is obtained through both cores and games. Formulas for the Shapley value derived from two different methods are shown to be identical. For illustration of our main results, several examples are given.
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Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank Professor Hung T. Nguyen for introducing this interesting topic to us and anonymous referees for their helpful comments which led to the big improvement of this paper.
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Appendix
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 4.4
Note that the left hand side of (18) is equal to
where
and
Now by using the following equality,
\(\alpha _i\)’s can be reduced so that the \(\phi _{ij}(\nu )\) is
Therefore, the bivariate Shapley value formula is given, after simplification, by
Note that Shavley value given in (20) is equivalent to the one given by the cores of the joint belief function \(H\), in (17). \(\square \)
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Wei, Z., Wang, T., Li, B., Nguyen, P.A. (2015). The Joint Belief Function and Shapley Value for the Joint Cooperative Game. In: Huynh, VN., Kreinovich, V., Sriboonchitta, S., Suriya, K. (eds) Econometrics of Risk. Studies in Computational Intelligence, vol 583. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13449-9_8
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