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Enhanced Bound for the Commutative Isogeny Hidden Number Problem in CSURF

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Progress in Cryptology – INDOCRYPT 2024 (INDOCRYPT 2024)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 15496))

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Abstract

We revisit the Commutative Isogeny Hidden Number Problem (CI-HNP), an analogue of the classical Hidden Number Problem in the CSURF setting, where an adversary is tasked with recovering a shared elliptic curve \( E_{AB} \) over a prime field GF(p) from partial information about the most significant bits (MSBs) of the Montgomery coefficient. In particular, we focus on improving the recovery bound for the CSURF protocol.

Meers and Nowakowski (Asiacrypt 2023) demonstrated that an adversary can recover \( E_{AB} \) in polynomial time when the total unknown portion is bounded by 73.2% of size of prime p. We present an enhanced attack that improves this bound to 77.9%. Our improvement is achieved by refining the application of Coppersmith method. Our result highlights the need for a thorough reassessment of bit security in isogeny-based cryptographic protocols like CSURF, particularly in the context of partial information attacks.

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Acknowledgements

The author would like to express sincere gratitude to Julian Nowakowski and Alexander May of Ruhr University Bochum for their valuable discussions and insights, which significantly contributed to shaping many of the ideas presented in this work during the author’s visit. The author also wishes to acknowledge the anonymous Indocrypt reviewers for their detailed comments.

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Correspondence to Santanu Sarkar .

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Sarkar, S. (2025). Enhanced Bound for the Commutative Isogeny Hidden Number Problem in CSURF. In: Mukhopadhyay, S., Stănică, P. (eds) Progress in Cryptology – INDOCRYPT 2024. INDOCRYPT 2024. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 15496. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-80311-6_10

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-80311-6_10

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