Abstract
Side-channel attacks are persistent vulnerabilities that exploit physical information surrounding a computer system, such as electromagnetic radiation, power consumption, and response time, to leak confidential information from within the system. The observed physical information is input into statistical analysis programs, or characteristics are discovered from processing steps within the computer system, allowing for the extraction of confidential information We propose a mechanism within the operating system to disrupt the power consumption waveforms, preventing the statistical analysis programs of power analysis attacks from functioning effectively. By implementing an API in the operating system to trigger empty interrupt processing solely for transforming the power consumption waveforms used in program sections handling confidential data, we aim to enhance tamper-resistance. In our evaluation, we demonstrated that the empty interrupt processing can effectively prevent the leakage of a 128-bit AES secret key, even with the analysis of one million power consumption waveforms, nearly entirely.
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Acknowledgments
This work was supported by JSPS KAKENHI Grant Number 24K14958, and by funding from Fukuoka University (Grant No. GR2410).
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Kato, S., Koyanagi, Y., Ukezono, T. (2025). An OS Support for Tamper-Resistant Software Execution Using Empty Interruptions. In: Patil, V.T., Krishnan, R., Shyamasundar, R.K. (eds) Information Systems Security. ICISS 2024. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 15416. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-80020-7_2
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