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Disorientation Faults in CSIDH

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Advances in Cryptology – EUROCRYPT 2023 (EUROCRYPT 2023)

Abstract

We investigate a new class of fault-injection attacks against the CSIDH family of cryptographic group actions. Our disorientation attacks effectively flip the direction of some isogeny steps. We achieve this by faulting a specific subroutine, connected to the Legendre symbol or Elligator computations performed during the evaluation of the group action. These subroutines are present in almost all known CSIDH implementations. Post-processing a set of faulty samples allows us to infer constraints on the secret key. The details are implementation specific, but we show that in many cases, it is possible to recover the full secret key with only a modest number of successful fault injections and modest computational resources. We provide full details for attacking the original CSIDH proof-of-concept software as well as the CTIDH constant-time implementation. Finally, we present a set of lightweight countermeasures against the attack and discuss their security.

The full version with additional material can be found at https://ia.cr/2022/1202.

Author list in alphabetical order; see https://ams.org/profession/leaders/CultureStatement04.pdf. This work began at the online Lorentz Center workshop “Post-Quantum Cryptography for Embedded Systems” held in February 2022. This research was funded in part by the European Commission through H2020 SPARTA, the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG, German Research Foundation) under SFB 1119 – 236615297 and under Germany’s Excellence Strategy—EXC 2092 CASA—390781972 “Cyber Security in the Age of Large-Scale Adversaries”, the Taiwan’s Executive Yuan Data Safety and Talent Cultivation Project (AS-KPQ-109-DSTCP), the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF) under the project QuantumRISC (ID 16KIS1039), the Academia Sinica Investigator Award AS-IA-109-M01, the Dutch Research Council (NWO) through Gravitation-grant Quantum Software Consortium – 024.003.037, and a gender balance subsidy of the Faculty of Science, Radboud University, project number 6201362. This work was done in part while Tanja Lange was visiting the Simons Institute for the Theory of Computing. Date of this document: 2023-02-23.

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Correspondence to Gustavo Banegas , Juliane Krämer , Tanja Lange , Michael Meyer , Lorenz Panny , Krijn Reijnders , Jana Sotáková or Monika Trimoska .

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Banegas, G. et al. (2023). Disorientation Faults in CSIDH. In: Hazay, C., Stam, M. (eds) Advances in Cryptology – EUROCRYPT 2023. EUROCRYPT 2023. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 14008. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-30589-4_11

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