Abstract
The traditional Dolev-Yao model of security limits attacks to “computationally feasible” operations. We depart from this model by assigning a cost to protocol actions, both of the Dolev-Yao kind as well as non traditional forms such as computationally-hard operations, guessing, principal subversion, and failure. This quantitative approach enables evaluating protocol resilience to various forms of denial of service, guessing attacks, and resource limitation. While the methodology is general, we demonstrate it through a low-level variant of the MSR specification language.
Partially supportcd by NRL under contract N00173-00-C-2086 and by ONR under contract number NO00149910150.
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Cervesato, I. (2006). Towards a Notion of Quantitative Security Analysis. In: Gollmann, D., Massacci, F., Yautsiukhin, A. (eds) Quality of Protection. Advances in Information Security, vol 23. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-36584-8_11
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-36584-8_11
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