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Automated Negotiation and Decision Making in Multiagent Environments

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Multi-Agent Systems and Applications (ACAI 2001)

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Abstract

This paper presents some of the key techniques for reaching agreements in multi-agent environments. It discusses game-theory and economics based techniques: strategic negotiation, auctions, coalition formation, market-oriented programming and contracting. It also presents logical based mechanisms for argumentations. The focus of the survey is on negotiation of self-interested agents, but several mechanisms for cooperative agents who need to resolve conflicts that arise from conflicting beliefs about different aspects of their environment are also mentioned. For space reasons, we couldn#x2019;t cover all the relevant works, and the papers that are mentioned only demonstrate the possible approaches. We present some of the properties of the approaches using our own previous work.

This work is supported in part by NSF under grant No.IIS-9820657.This paper isbased on hapters in S.Kraus.Strategic Negotiation in Multi-Agent Environments,MIT Press,Cambridge,USA,2001 and on S.Kraus,K.Sy ara and A.Even hik.Reaching agreements through argumentation:a logical model and implementation,Artificial Intelligence Journal 104(1-2):1-69,1998.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Dept. of Mathematics and Computer Science, Bar-Ilan University, Ramat-Gan, 52900, Israel

    Sarit Kraus

  2. Institute for Advanced Computer Studies, University of Maryland, College Park, MD, 20742, USA

    Sarit Kraus

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  1. Sarit Kraus
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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Electronics and Computer Science Highfield, University of Southampton, Southampton, SO17 1BJ, UK

    Michael Luck

  2. Facultiy of Electr. Engineering, Dept. of Cybernetics Technicka 2, Czech Technical University, 166 27, Prague 6, Czech Republic

    Vladimír Mařík  & Olga Štěpánková  & 

  3. Dept.of Med. Cybernetics and Artificial Intelligence, University of Vienna, Freyung 6, 1010, Vienna, Austria

    Robert Trappl

  4. Austrian Research Institute for Artificial Intelligence, Schottengasse 3, 1010, Vienna, Austria

    Robert Trappl

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Kraus, S. (2001). Automated Negotiation and Decision Making in Multiagent Environments. In: Luck, M., Mařík, V., Štěpánková, O., Trappl, R. (eds) Multi-Agent Systems and Applications. ACAI 2001. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 2086. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-47745-4_7

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