Abstract
The purpose of this communication is to present an evolutionary study of cooperation between two ethnic groups. The used approach is reformulated in a form of evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma method, where a population of strategies is evolved by applying simple reproduction process with a Darwin metaphor of natural selection (a probability of selection to the reproduction is proportional to a fitness). Our computer simulations show that an application of a principle of collective quilt does not lead to an emergence of an interethnic cooperation. When an administrator is introduced, then an emergence of interethnic cooperation may be observed. Furthermore, if the ethnic groups are of very different sizes, then the principle of collective guilt may be very devastating for smaller group so that intraethnic cooperation is destroyed. The second strategy of cooperation is called the personal responsibility, where agents that defected within interethnic interactions are punished inside of their ethnic groups. It means, unlikely to the principle of collective guilt, there exists only one type of punishment, loosely speaking, agents are punished “personally”.
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© 2001 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Kvasnicka, V., Pospíchal, J. (2001). A Multi-agent Study of Interethnic Cooperation. In: Luck, M., Mařík, V., Štěpánková, O., Trappl, R. (eds) Multi-Agent Systems and Applications. ACAI 2001. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 2086. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-47745-4_20
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-47745-4_20
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