Abstract
We describe how an open computing device can be extended to allow individual programs and operating systems to have exclusive access to cryptographic keys. This problem is of fundamental importance in areas such as virus protection, protection of servers from network attacks, network administration and copy protection. We seek a system that can be unconditionally robust against software attacks. This requires measures in hardware and in software. Our analysis allows us to minimize the amount of additional hardware needed to support the system.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
DOD 5200.28-STD. Department of defense trusted computer system evaluation criteria. December 1985.
Trusted Computing Platform Alliance. TCPA main specification version 1.1. http://www.trustedpc.org, 2001.
W. A. Arbaugh, D. J. Faber, and J. M. Smith. A secure and reliable bootstrap architecture. In Proceedings of the 1997 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pages 65–71, 1997.
D. Aucsmith. Tamper-resistant software: An implementation. In Ross Anderson, editor, Information hiding: first international workshop, Cambridge, U.K., volume 1174 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 317–333. Springer-Verlag, 1996.
B. Barak, O. Goldreich, R. Impagliazzo, S. Rudich, A. Sahai, S. Vadhan, and K. Yang. On the (im)possibility of obfuscating programs. In Advances in Cryptology-CRYPTO 2001, pages 1–18. Springer-Verlag, 2001.
M. Bellare, R. Canetti, and H. Krawczyk. Keying hash functions for message authentication. In Advances in Cryptology-Crypto’96, number 1109 in Lecture Notes in CS, 1996.
P. England, J. DeTreville, and B. Lampson. A trusted open platform. Unpublished.
N. Itoi, W. A. Arbaugh, S. J. Pollack, and D. M. Reeves. Personal secure booting. In V. Varadharajan and Y. Mu, editors, Information Security and Privacy-6th Australasian Conference, ACISP 2001. Springer-Verlag, 2001.
B. Lampson. Protection. ACM Operating Systems Review, 8(1):18–24, 1974.
B. Lampson, M. Abadi, and M. Burrows. Authentication in distributed systems: Theory and practice. ACM Transactions on Computer Systems, 10:265–310, November 1992.
A. Menezes, P. van Oorschot, and S. Vanstone. Handbook of Applied Cryptography. CRC Press, 1997.
S. W. Smith and V. Austel. Trusting trusted hardware: Towards a formal model for programmable secure coprocessors. In Proceedings of the Third USENIX Workshop on Electronic Commerce, pages 83–98, 1998.
S. W. Smith, E. R. Palmer, and S. Weingart. Using a high-performance, programmable secure coprocessor. In Proceedings of the Second International Conference on Financial Cryptography. Springer-Verlag, 1998.
S. W. Smith and S. Weingart. Building a high-performance, programmable secure coprocessor. Computer Networks, 31(8):831–860, April 1999.
B. Yee. Using Secure Coprocessors. PhD thesis, Carnegie Mellon University, 1994.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2002 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this paper
Cite this paper
England, P., Peinado, M. (2002). Authenticated Operation of Open Computing Devices. In: Batten, L., Seberry, J. (eds) Information Security and Privacy. ACISP 2002. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 2384. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45450-0_27
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45450-0_27
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-43861-8
Online ISBN: 978-3-540-45450-2
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive