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Ciphertext-Auditable Public Key Encryption

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Advances in Information and Computer Security (IWSEC 2006)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 4266))

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Abstract

Loss of backup tapes containing personal information (PI) is a potential breach of privacy and encryption is the typical way to prevent the breach. This paper considers an attack scenario where an adversary who encrypts the PI for backup purpose tries to hide the plain PI in a valid-looking ciphertext without being detected. We show that the standard security notion IND-CCA2 does not capture such a scenario. For example, the Cramer-Shoup scheme is vulnerable to such an attack. To capture such a scenario, we define a new notion of “ciphertext-auditability” as a new property of public key encryption schemes (PKESs). It requires that, given a public key and a ciphertext, anyone should be able to verify whether the ciphertext was actually generated using the public key. Also, it requires that, given a public key and a plaintext, no adversary should be able to generate a valid-looking ciphertext so that the verification passes, but nevertheless the plaintext can be recovered from the ciphertext without the corresponding secret key. We propose a general construction of such PKESs based on standard cryptographic primitives in the random oracle model.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Tokyo Research Laboratory, IBM Research, 1623-14, Shimotsuruma, Yamato, Kanagawa, 242-8502, Japan

    Satoshi Hada

  2. Dept. of Computer Science and Communication Engineering, Kyushu University, Hakozaki, Fukuoka, 812-81, Japan

    Kouichi Sakurai

Authors
  1. Satoshi Hada
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  2. Kouichi Sakurai
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Faculty of Electro-Communication, The University of Electro-Communications, 1-5-1, Chofugaoka, P.O. Box, 182-8585, Chofu, Japan

    Hiroshi Yoshiura

  2. Department of Computer Science, Communication Engineering, Kyushu University, 812-0053, Fukuoka, Japan

    Kouichi Sakurai

  3. Institute of Business Informatics, Goethe University Frankfurt, Frankfurt/Main, Germany

    Kai Rannenberg

  4. Faculty of Software and Information Science, Iwate Prefectural University, 152-52 Sugo, Takizawa, Takizawa-mura, 020-0193, Iwate, Japan

    Yuko Murayama

  5. Toshiba Corporation, 1, Komukai Toshiba-cho, Saiwai-ku, P.O. Box, 212-8582, Kawasaki, Japan

    Shinichi Kawamura

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© 2006 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Hada, S., Sakurai, K. (2006). Ciphertext-Auditable Public Key Encryption. In: Yoshiura, H., Sakurai, K., Rannenberg, K., Murayama, Y., Kawamura, S. (eds) Advances in Information and Computer Security. IWSEC 2006. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 4266. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11908739_22

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11908739_22

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-47699-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-47700-6

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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