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Timed Spi-Calculus with Types for Secrecy and Authenticity

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CONCUR 2005 – Concurrency Theory (CONCUR 2005)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNTCS,volume 3653))

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Abstract

We present a discretely timed spi-calculus. A primitive for key compromise allows us to model key compromise attacks, thus going beyond the standard Dolev-Yao attacker model. A primitive for reading a global clock allows us to express protocols based on timestamps, which are common in practice. We accompany the timed spi-calculus with a type system, prove that well-typed protocols are robustly safe for secrecy and authenticity and present examples of well-typed protocols as well as an example where failure to typecheck reveals a (well-known) flaw.

This material is based upon work supported by the National Science Foundation under Grant No. 0208459.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. CTI, DePaul University,  

    Christian Haack & Alan Jeffrey

  2. Bell Labs, Lucent Technologies,  

    Alan Jeffrey

Authors
  1. Christian Haack
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  2. Alan Jeffrey
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. University of California, Santa Cruz

    Martín Abadi

  2. University of California, Santa Cruz, USA

    Luca de Alfaro

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Haack, C., Jeffrey, A. (2005). Timed Spi-Calculus with Types for Secrecy and Authenticity. In: Abadi, M., de Alfaro, L. (eds) CONCUR 2005 – Concurrency Theory. CONCUR 2005. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3653. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11539452_18

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11539452_18

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-28309-6

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-31934-4

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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