Abstract
Heavily based on the provable security model of Canetti and Krawczyk (CK-model), an identity-based authentication and key exchange (AKE) protocol which uses pairings is proposed for securing heterogeneous wireless access in this paper. By using the CK-model approach, an ideal and secure key exchange protocol was first proposed. Then a full-fledged authenticator is built to provide authentication of the ideal protocol. This completes a practical AKE protocol for heterogeneous environment while carrying the security proof. Analysis shows that our protocol is secure with partial forward secrecy, and efficient for considering the asymmetric wireless environment.
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Jiang, J., He, C., Jiang, Lg. (2005). On the Design of Provably Secure Identity-Based Authentication and Key Exchange Protocol for Heterogeneous Wireless Access. In: Lu, X., Zhao, W. (eds) Networking and Mobile Computing. ICCNMC 2005. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3619. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11534310_102
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11534310_102
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-28102-3
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