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. 2020 Dec;44(12):e12898.
doi: 10.1111/cogs.12898.

Rectifying the Mischaracterization of Logic by Mental Model Theorists

Selmer Bringsjord  1 , Naveen Sundar Govindarajulu  1
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Free article

Rectifying the Mischaracterization of Logic by Mental Model Theorists

Selmer Bringsjord et al. Cogn Sci. 2020 Dec.
Free article

Abstract

Khemlani et al. (2018) mischaracterize logic in the course of seeking to show that mental model theory (MMT) can accommodate a form of inference ( I , let us label it) they find in a high percentage of their subjects. We reveal their mischaracterization and, in so doing, lay a landscape for future modeling by cognitive scientists who may wonder whether human reasoning is consistent with, or perhaps even capturable by, reasoning in a logic or family thereof. Along the way, we note that the properties touted by Khemlani et al. as innovative aspects of MMT-based modeling (e.g., nonmonotonicity) have for decades been, in logic, acknowledged and rigorously specified by families of (implemented) logics. Khemlani et al. (2018) further declare that I is "invalid in any modal logic." We demonstrate this to be false by our introduction (Appendix A) of a new propositional modal logic (within a family of such logics) in which I is provably valid, and by the implementation of this logic. A second appendix, B, partially answers the two-part question, "What is a formal logic, and what is it for one to capture empirical phenomena?"

Keywords: Formal logic; Logic; Mental models theory; Modal logic.

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