Classical and Quantum Generic Attacks on 6-round Feistel Schemes

Paper 2024/458

Classical and Quantum Generic Attacks on 6-round Feistel Schemes

Maya Chartouny, Thales DIS, Université Paris-Saclay, UVSQ, CNRS, Laboratoire de mathématiques de Versailles
Benoit Cogliati, Thales DIS
Jacques Patarin, Thales DIS, Université Paris-Saclay, UVSQ, CNRS, Laboratoire de mathématiques de Versailles
Abstract

In this paper, we describe new quantum generic attacks on 6 rounds balanced Feistel networks with internal functions or internal permutations. In order to obtain our new quantum attacks, we revisit a result of Childs and Eisenberg that extends Ambainis' collision finding algorithm to the subset finding problem. In more details, we continue their work by carefully analyzing the time complexity of their algorithm. We also use four points structures attacks instead of two points structures attacks that leads to a complexity of $\mathcal{O}(2^{8n/5})$ instead of $\mathcal{O}(2^{2n})$. Moreover, we have also found a classical (i.e. non quantum) improved attack on $6$ rounds with internal permutations. The complexity here will be in $\mathcal{O}(2^{2n})$ instead of $\mathcal{O}(2^{3n})$ previously known.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Attacks and cryptanalysis
Publication info
Preprint.
Keywords
Feistel ciphersPseudo-random permutationQuantum cryptanalysisLuby–Rackoff block cipherSubset finding problem
Contact author(s)
maya saab-chartouni @ thalesgroup com
benoit-michel cogliati @ thalesgroup com
jacques patarin @ thalesgroup com
History
2024-03-22: approved
2024-03-18: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2024/458
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2024/458,
      author = {Maya Chartouny and Benoit Cogliati and Jacques Patarin},
      title = {Classical and Quantum Generic Attacks on 6-round Feistel Schemes},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2024/458},
      year = {2024},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/458}
}
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