[2410.01107] Count of Monte Crypto: Accounting-based Defenses for Cross-Chain Bridges
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Computer Science > Cryptography and Security

arXiv:2410.01107 (cs)
[Submitted on 1 Oct 2024 (v1), last revised 15 Nov 2024 (this version, v2)]

Title:Count of Monte Crypto: Accounting-based Defenses for Cross-Chain Bridges

Authors:Enze Liu, Elisa Luo, Jian Chen Yan, Katherine Izhikevich, Stewart Grant, Deian Stefan, Geoffrey M Voelker, Stefan Savage
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Abstract:Between 2021 and 2023, crypto assets valued at over \$US2.6 billion were stolen via attacks on "bridges" -- decentralized services designed to allow inter-blockchain exchange. While the individual exploits in each attack vary, a single design flaw underlies them all: the lack of end-to-end value accounting in cross-chain transactions. In this paper, we empirically analyze 10 million transactions used by key bridges during this period. We show that a simple invariant that balances cross-chain inflows and outflows is compatible with legitimate use, yet precisely identifies every known attack (and several likely attacks) in this data. Further, we show that this approach is not only sufficient for post-hoc audits, but can be implemented in-line in existing bridge designs to provide generic protection against a broad array of bridge vulnerabilities.
Comments: Currently under submission
Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR)
Cite as: arXiv:2410.01107 [cs.CR]
  (or arXiv:2410.01107v2 [cs.CR] for this version)
  https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2410.01107

Submission history

From: Enze Liu [view email]
[v1] Tue, 1 Oct 2024 22:33:03 UTC (7,286 KB)
[v2] Fri, 15 Nov 2024 07:01:15 UTC (7,506 KB)
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