[2204.04008] Taxonomy of Attacks on Open-Source Software Supply Chains
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Computer Science > Cryptography and Security

arXiv:2204.04008 (cs)
[Submitted on 8 Apr 2022 (v1), last revised 19 Apr 2022 (this version, v2)]

Title:Taxonomy of Attacks on Open-Source Software Supply Chains

Authors:Piergiorgio Ladisa, Henrik Plate, Matias Martinez, Olivier Barais
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Abstract:The widespread dependency on open-source software makes it a fruitful target for malicious actors, as demonstrated by recurring attacks. The complexity of today's open-source supply chains results in a significant attack surface, giving attackers numerous opportunities to reach the goal of injecting malicious code into open-source artifacts that is then downloaded and executed by victims.
This work proposes a general taxonomy for attacks on open-source supply chains, independent of specific programming languages or ecosystems, and covering all supply chain stages from code contributions to package distribution. Taking the form of an attack tree, it covers 107 unique vectors, linked to 94 real-world incidents, and mapped to 33 mitigating safeguards.
User surveys conducted with 17 domain experts and 134 software developers positively validated the correctness, comprehensiveness and comprehensibility of the taxonomy, as well as its suitability for various use-cases. Survey participants also assessed the utility and costs of the identified safeguards, and whether they are used.
Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Software Engineering (cs.SE)
Cite as: arXiv:2204.04008 [cs.CR]
  (or arXiv:2204.04008v2 [cs.CR] for this version)
  https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2204.04008
Journal reference: 2023 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP), San Francisco, CA, US, 2023 pp. 1509-1526
Related DOI: https://doi.org/10.1109/SP46215.2023.00010

Submission history

From: Piergiorgio Ladisa [view email]
[v1] Fri, 8 Apr 2022 11:37:24 UTC (10,494 KB)
[v2] Tue, 19 Apr 2022 19:02:15 UTC (10,494 KB)
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