Characterization of Incentive Compatibility of an Ex-ante Constrained Player

Authors

  • Bonan Ni Institute for Interdisciplinary Information Sciences, Tsinghua University
  • Pingzhong Tang Institute for Interdisciplinary Information Sciences, Tsinghua University

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v36i5.20450

Keywords:

Game Theory And Economic Paradigms (GTEP)

Abstract

We consider a variant of the standard Bayesian mechanism, where players evaluate their outcomes and constraints in an ex-ante manner. Such a model captures a major form of modern online advertising where an advertiser is concerned with her/his expected utility over a time period and her/his type may change over time. We are interested in the incentive compatibility (IC) problem of such Bayesian mechanism. Under very mild conditions on the mechanism environments, we give a full characterization of IC via the taxation principle and show, perhaps surprisingly, that such IC mechanisms are fully characterized by the so-called auto-bidding mechanisms, which are pervasively fielded in the online advertising industry.
AAAI-22 Proceedings Cover

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Published

2022-06-28

How to Cite

Ni, B., & Tang, P. (2022). Characterization of Incentive Compatibility of an Ex-ante Constrained Player. Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 36(5), 5156-5163. https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v36i5.20450

Issue

Vol. 36 No. 5: AAAI-22 Technical Tracks 5

Section

AAAI Technical Track on Game Theory and Economic Paradigms