Abstract
Despite various attempts to rectify matters, the internalism-externalism (I-E) debate in epistemology remains mired in serious confusion. I present a new account of this debate, one which fits well with entrenched views on the I-E distinction and illuminates the fundamental disagreements at the heart of the debate. Roughly speaking, the I-E debate is over whether or not certain of the necessary conditions of positive epistemic status are internal. But what is the sense of ‘internal’ here? And of which conditions of which positive epistemic status are we speaking? I argue that an adequate answer to these questions requires reference to what I call the no-defeater condition which is satisfied by a subject’s belief B just in case she does not believe that B is defeated. I close by stating succinctly the main positions taken in the I-E debate, identifying the basic points of disagreement and suggesting fruitful courses for future discussion.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
REFERENCES
Ackerman, F.: 1992, ‘Analysis and Its Paradoxes’, in E. Ullman-Margalit (ed.), The Scientific Enterprise, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston, pp. 169–78.
Alston, W.: 1985, ‘Concepts of Epistemic Justification’, in W. Alston, 1989, pp. 81–114.
Alston, W.: 1986, ‘Internalism and Externalism in Epistemology’, in W. Alston, 1989, pp. 185–226.
Alston, W.: 1988a, ‘An Internalist Externalism”, in W. Alston, 1989, pp. 227–45.
Alston, W.: 1988b, ‘Justification and Knowledge’, in W. Alston, 1989, pp. 172–82.
Alston, W.: 1989, Epistemic Justification, Cornell University Press, Ithaca.
Alston, W.: 1993, ‘Epistemic Desiderata’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53, 527–51.
Armstrong, D.: 1973, Belief, Truth and Knowledge, Cambridge University Press, New York.
BonJour, L.: 1985, The Structure of Empirical Knowledge, Harvard University Press, Cambridge.
Chisholm, R.: 1982, ‘Knowledge as Justified True Belief’, in Foundations of Knowing, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis.
Chisholm, R.: 1986a, ‘Self-Profile’, in Roderick Chisholm, D. Reidel, Boston, pp. 3–77.
Chisholm, R.: 1986b, ‘The Place of Epistemic Justification’, Philosophical Topics 14, 85–92.
Chisholm, R.: 1989, Theory of Knowledge, (3rd edition), Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs.
Dretske, F.: 1981, Knowledge and the Flow of Information, MIT Press, Cambridge.
Dretske, F.: 1991, ‘Two Conceptions of Knowledge: Rational vs. Reliable Belief’, Grazier Philosophische Studien 40, 15–30.
Feldman, R.: 1993, ‘Proper Functionalism’, Noûs 27, 34–50.
Gettier, E.: 1963, ‘Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?’, Analysis 23, 121–23.
Ginet, C.: 1995, ‘Comments on Plantinga’s Two-Volume Work on Warrant’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55, 403–8.
Goldman, A.: 1979, ‘What is Justified Belief?’, in G. S. Pappas (ed.), Justification and Knowledge, D. Reidel, Boston, pp. 1–23.
Goldman, A.: 1980, ‘The Internalist Conception of Justification’, in Peter French, Theodore E. Uehling, Jr. and Howard K. Wettstein (eds.), Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 5: Studies in Epistemology, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, pp. 27–51.
Goldman, A.: 1986, Epistemology and Cognition, Harvard University Press, Cambridge.
Goldman, A.: 1988, ‘Strong and Weak Justification’, in James Tomberlin (ed.), Philosophical Perspectives, 2, Epistemology, Ridgeview Publishing Company, Atascadero, pp. 51–69.
Kim, K.: 1993, ‘Internalism and Externalism in Epistemology’, American Philosophical Quarterly 30, 303–16.
Lehrer, K.: 1988, ‘Metaknowledge: Undefeated Justification’, Synthese 74, 329–47.
Lehrer, K.: 1989, ‘Knowledge Reconsidered’, in Marjorie Clay and Keith Lehrer (eds.), Knowledge and Scepticism, Westview Press, Boulder, pp. 131–54.
Lehrer, K.: 1990, Theory of Knowledge, Westview Press, Boulder.
Luper-Foy, S.: 1988, ‘The Knower, Inside and Out’, Synthese 74, 349–67.
Moser, P.: 1985, Empirical Justification, D. Reidel, Boston.
Nozick, R.: 1981, Philosophical Explanations, The Belknap Press, Cambridge.
Plantinga, A.: 1993a, Warrant and Proper Function, Oxford University Press, New York.
Plantinga, A.: 1993b, Warrant: The Current Debate, Oxford University Press, New York.
Pollock, J.: 1986, Contemporary Theories of Knowledge, Rowman and Littlefield, Savage.
Sosa, E.: 1985, ‘The Coherence of Virtue and the Virtue of Coherence’, in E. Sosa, 1991a, pp. 192–214.
Sosa, E.: 1991a, Knowledge in Perspective, Cambridge University Press, New York.
Sosa, E.: 1991b, ‘Reliabilism and Intellectual Virtue’, in E. Sosa, 1991a, pp. 131–45.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Bergmann, M. Internalism, Externalism and The No-Defeater Condition. Synthese 110, 399–417 (1997). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1004993228686
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1004993228686