Optimal quality regulation on the online health platform | Electronic Markets Skip to main content

Advertisement

Log in

Optimal quality regulation on the online health platform

  • Research Paper
  • Published:
Electronic Markets Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

The information asymmetry of online healthcare services in China puts pressure on platforms to assure service efficacy. To prevent the online healthcare market failure and investigate optimal pricing and profits, we compared three quality regulation strategies: (1) no regulation; (2) exclusion: the platform excludes low-quality physicians; and (3) quality certification: the platform certifies high-quality physicians. Our analysis indicates that quality management improves the average quality of registered physicians, the number of users (patients and physicians), and social welfare. The quality certification strategy maximizes social welfare, whereas the exclusion strategy maximizes the scale of high-quality physicians and registered physicians’ average quality. Furthermore, the exclusion strategy can generate the highest profits for the platform only when patients have high enough quality preferences. Finally, the pricing level of healthcare platforms is influenced by network externality and certification investment. This study provides guiding principles for platform managers to regulate online healthcare services.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Subscribe and save

Springer+ Basic
¥17,985 /Month
  • Get 10 units per month
  • Download Article/Chapter or eBook
  • 1 Unit = 1 Article or 1 Chapter
  • Cancel anytime
Subscribe now

Buy Now

Price includes VAT (Japan)

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Fig. 1
Fig. 2
Fig. 3
Fig. 4
Fig. 5
Fig. 6
Fig. 7
Fig. 8

Similar content being viewed by others

Explore related subjects

Discover the latest articles, news and stories from top researchers in related subjects.

Data availability

Data on results is available upon request.

References

Download references

Acknowledgements

We appreciate the help of editors. All remaining errors are ours.

Funding

This research is funded by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (71974082).

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Contributions

Conceptualization and literature review, Zhiqiang Ma and Jianyue Liu; methodology, Jianyue Liu; calculation, Jianyue Liu; writing and editing, Jianyue Liu and Zhiqiang Ma. All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Zhiqiang Ma.

Ethics declarations

Conflict of interest

The authors declare no competing interests.

Additional information

Responsible Editor: Reima Suomi

Publisher's Note

Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

Supplementary Information

Below is the link to the electronic supplementary material.

Supplementary file1 (DOCX 23 KB)

Rights and permissions

Springer Nature or its licensor (e.g. a society or other partner) holds exclusive rights to this article under a publishing agreement with the author(s) or other rightsholder(s); author self-archiving of the accepted manuscript version of this article is solely governed by the terms of such publishing agreement and applicable law.

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Liu, J., Ma, Z. Optimal quality regulation on the online health platform. Electron Markets 33, 50 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12525-023-00670-3

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12525-023-00670-3

Keywords

JEL Classification

Navigation