Zusammenfassung
Ein Ziel der DSGVO ist, die Grundrechte und Grundfreiheiten natürlicher Personen besser zu schützen. Entscheidend hierfür ist eine wirkungsvolle Durchsetzung der rechtlichen Vorgaben. Dazu sieht die DSGVO deutlich härtere Sanktionen vor, die laut Art. 83 Abs. 1 wirksam und abschreckend sein sollen. Ist die Verhängung hoher Bußgelder solch ein wirksames und abschreckendes Mittel? Wir gehen der Frage nach, was die Wissenschaft darüber weiß, warum sich Unternehmen überhaupt an Recht und Gesetz halten und was man daraus für Schlüsse für das künftige Sanktionsregime der DSGVO ziehen kann.
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Martin, N., Friedewald, M. Warum Unternehmen sich (nicht) an Recht und Gesetz halten . Datenschutz Datensich 43, 493–497 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11623-019-1150-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11623-019-1150-2