Abstract
Cooperative communication utilizes multi-user spatial diversity to improve spectrum efficiency and channel capacity. However, due to the limited wireless network resource, the selfish relay nodes may be unwilling to offer their relay assistance without any extra incentive. In this paper, the incentive issue between multiple wireless nodes’ relay service and multiple sources’ relay selection is investigated. By modelling multi-user cooperative relay as a labour market, a contract model is proposed with the combination of relay power and basic wage. A relay factor is introduced to describe the contract-relay strategy in cooperative communication. To incentivize the relay nodes to participate in multiple sources’ relay efficiently and credibly, an optimization problem of multi-user relay incentive is formulated to obtain the sources’ maximum cooperative utility under the individually rational restraints. By exploiting the hidden convexity of the non-convex problems in both single-source and multi-source scenarios, the efficient iterative algorithms are developed. Numerical results show that the performance of our approach yields a significant enhancement compared with the equal relay-power and equal relay-factor strategies.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Nosratinia, A., Hunter, T. E., & Hedayat, A. (2004). Cooperative communication in wireless networks. IEEE Communications Magazine, 42(10), 74–80.
Zhou, Z., Zhou, S., Cui, J., & Cui, S. (2008). Energy-efficient cooperative communication based on power control and selective single-relay in wireless sensor networks. IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications, 7(8), 3066–3078.
Laneman, J. N., Tse, D. N. C., & Wornell, G. W. (2004). Cooperative diversity in wireless networks: Efficient protocols and outage behavior. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, 50(12), 3062–3080.
Shastry, N., & Adve, R. (2006). Stimulating cooperative diversity in wireless ad hoc networks through pricing. IEEE International Conference on Communications, IEEE ICC, 2006(2006), 3747–3752.
Astaneh, S. A., & Gazor, S. (2009). Resource allocation and relay selection for collaborative communications. IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications, 8(12), 6126–6133.
Hong, X., Wang, J., Wang, C., & Shi, J. (2014). Cognitive radio in 5G: A perspective on energy-spectral efficiency trade-off. IEEE Communications Magazine, 52(7), 46–53.
Hasan, Z., & Bhargava, V. K. (2013). Relay selection for OFDM wireless systems under asymmetric information: A contract-theory based approach. IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications, 12(8), 3824–3837.
Zhang, G., Yang, K., Liu, P., & Feng, X. (2013). Incentive mechanism for multiuser cooperative relaying in wireless ad hoc networks: A resource-exchange based approach. Wireless Personal Communications, 73(3), 697–715.
Duan, L., Gao, L., & Huang, J. (2014). Cooperative spectrum sharing: A contract-based approach. IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing, 13(1), 174–187.
Cong, L., Zhao, L., Zhang, H., et al. (2011). Pricing-based game for spectrum allocation in multi-relay cooperative transmission networks. IET Communications, 5(4), 563–573.
Wang, B., et al. (2009). Distributed relay selection and power control for multiuser cooperative communication networks using Stackelberg game. IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing, 8(7), 975–990.
Gao, L., Huang, J., Chen, Y. J., & Shou, B. (2013). An integrated contract and auction design for secondary spectrum sharing. IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, 31(3), 581–592.
Sheng, S., & Liu, M. (2014). Profit incentive in trading nonexclusive access on a secondary spectrum market through contract design. IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking, 22(4), 1190–1203.
Zhao, N., Wu, M., Xiong, W., & Liu, C. (2015). Cooperative communication in cognitive radio networks under asymmetric information: A contract-theory based approach. International Journal of Distributed Sensor Networks, 2015(676195), 1–11.
Zhao, N., Wu, M., Xiong, W., & Liu, C. (2015). Optimal contract design for cooperative relay incentive mechanism under moral hazard. Journal of Electrical and Computer Engineering, 2015(690807), 1–7.
Bolton, P., & Dewatripont, M. (2005). Contract theory. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Salani’e, B. (2005). The economics of contracts: A primer. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Gibbons, R. (2005). Incentives between firms (and within). Management Science, 51(1), 2–17.
Zhao, N., Pu, F., Xu, X., & Chen, N. (2013). Optimisation of multi-channel cooperative sensing in cognitive radio networks. IET Communications, 7(12), 1177–1190.
Hossain, E., & Bhargava, V. K. (2007). Cognitive wireless communication networks, (edited volume). New York: Springer.
Bezdek, J., & Hathaway, R. (2002). Some notes on alternating optimization, In Proceedings of 2002 Advances in Soft Computing, 2002, pp. 187–195.
Boyd, S., & Vandenberghe, L. (2004). Convex optimization. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Acknowledgments
This work was supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China (No. 61501178), Natural Science Foundation of Hubei Province (No. 2015CFB646), Open Foundation of Hubei Collaborative Innovation Center for High-efficient Utilization of Solar Energy (No. HBSKFMS2014033). The author would like to acknowledge the anonymous reviewers whose constructive criticism, comments, and suggestions led to a greatly improved manuscript.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Appendix
Appendix
In this appendix, how the RNs’ power constraint affects the performance of cooperative communication is investigated. First, we focus on the single source scenario. Suppose that the maximum relay power of the ith RN at the source’s receiver as \(\bar{P}\), then, the source’s utility maximization problem can be designed as follows
Similar to Sect. 3, we can obtain the optimal basic wage \(\alpha_{i}^{*} = \theta_{i} p_{i} - \beta p_{i}\). Then, the source’s utility maximization problem in (20) can be simplified as
which can be solved by Algorithm 1 similarly.
Next, simulation result is given to analyze the performance of the optimal contract design method with one source and two RNs (N 1 = N 2 = 1). Figure 10 plots the source’s optimal utility with the two typical RNs’ power constraint scenarios. Scenario S1 describes the situation in which the optimal \(p_{i}^{*}\) in Problem P2 is smaller than \(\bar{P}_{i}\). Scenario S2 describes the situation in which the optimal \(p_{i}^{*}\) in Problem P2 is more than \(\bar{P}_{i}\) With the power constraint \(\bar{P}_{i}\) above the optimal \(p_{i}^{*}\), Scenario S1 achieves the higher source’s optimal utility. And as the optimal \(p_{i}^{*}\) is more than \(\bar{P}_{i}\) in Scenario S2, the source cannot get the enough relay help from the two RNs, thus, Scenario S2 obtains the lower source’s optimal utility. However, even with such power constraints, the source’s utility is also enhanced compared with the non-cooperative communication.
As for the multiple sources’ relay incentive scenario, the sources’ utility maximization problem can be rewritten by considering the RNs’ power constraint \(0 \le p_{i} \le \bar{P}_{i}\). From the IC and the power constraints, we can also get the optimal relay power and relay factor with Algorithm 2. Similar to the above analysis, the sources’ utility can be similarly enhanced with the optimal contract design even with the relay power constraints. Introducing the relay power constraints will not change this result. Due to the page limits, we skip the detailed analysis of the multiple sources scenario.
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Zhao, N. A Contract-Based Model for Multiuser Cooperative Relay in Wireless Communication Networks. Wireless Pers Commun 96, 5105–5121 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11277-016-3731-9
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11277-016-3731-9