Abstract
Having direct doxastic control would not be particularly desirable if exercising it required a failure of epistemic rationality. With that thought in mind, recent writers have invoked the view that epistemic rationality gives us options to defend the possibility of a significant form of direct doxastic control. Specifically, they suggest that when the evidence for p is sufficient but not conclusive, it would be epistemically rational either to believe p or to be agnostic on p, and they argue that we can in these cases effectively decide to form either attitude without irrationality. This paper argues against the version of epistemic permissivism invoked by these writers and shows that other plausible versions of permissivism do not support their cause. It concludes that if we can exercise direct doxastic control without irrationality, it is not because epistemic rationality gives us options.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
See Bennett (1999)’s example of the Credamites.
Though as Adler stresses (2002, p. 63), the cases that interested James were ones where the absence of decisive evidence wasn’t merely a temporary limitation; other voluntarists “want the blessing to extend much farther”.
Arguments of this form are not unprecedented in the relevant literature, however. From Williams (1973) onwards, many arguments for involuntarism have appealed to substantive norms like the truth norm, the knowledge norm, or evidentialist norms. See, e.g., Foley (1993, p. 16), Hieronymi (2006) and Velleman (2000). Some of these writers appeal only directly to the idea that belief has a certain aim, which might appear to be a non-normative claim. But as Wedgwood (2002), Shah (2003), Shah and Velleman (2005) and Gibbard (2005) argue, the idea that belief has an aim is best understood in terms of a normative standard of correctness.
Some opponents of direct voluntarism considered the kinds of cases invoked by proponents of the Argument from Discretion and defended a conclusion like mine. Alston (1988, pp. 264–266), Feldman (2000, p. 681), and Adler (2002, p. 62) consider cases of good but inconclusive evidence and argue that when carefully examined, these cases don’t support direct voluntarism. Proponents of the Argument from Discretion neglect these earlier diagnoses of their cases.
Discretion might be traced back as far as Chisholm. In particular, Chisholm (1977) defines epistemic “acceptability” in a way that makes room for discretion, and embraces Discretion for epistemic acceptability:
All propositions that are beyond reasonable doubt will, of course, be acceptable, but there are many acceptable propositions that are not beyond reasonable doubt. Any adequate theory of perception, for example, might require us to say this: if I have that experience which might naturally be expressed by saying that I ‘seem to see’ a certain state of affairs (e.g., ‘I seem to see a man standing there’), then the state of affairs that I thus seem to perceive...is one that is, for me, ipso facto acceptable. It may be, however, that although the proposition is thus acceptable, it is not beyond reasonable doubt: i.e., although withholding it is not more reasonable than believing it, believing it cannot be said to be more reasonable than withholding it.
Similar claims appear in Chisholm (1982, p. 15). Interestingly, however, he here thinks that there is a difference between acceptability and reasonableness: “‘Acceptable’, then, expresses less praise than does ‘reasonable”’. And elsewhere he defines reasonableness in a way that seems to preclude discretion for it; e.g., in Chisholm (1988, p. 82) and Chisholm (1966, p. 22), he stipulates that a belief is reasonable iff believing is preferable to withholding.
White (2005, p. 453).
McHugh and Frankish use the term “sufficient”, while Nickel uses the term “adequate”. Raz and Ginet use neither term, but it seems clear that they have the same cases in mind.
I will return to this point again later, since it will play a role in my error theory. Precisely this point led Alston to doubt that cases where the evidence supports a proposition inconclusively are cases in which we can exercise direct doxastic control: “[H]ere too belief follows automatically, without intervention by the will, from the way things seem at the moment to the subject.” (1988, p. 266)
Way (2007) expresses this tempting inference nicely: “It is far from obvious why there cannot be evidential states good enough to permit belief in p, without requiring belief in p, and thereby also permitting suspension of belief in p” (228; italics mine).
For a defense of the non-existence of positive epistemic duties along these lines, see Nelson (2010).
McHugh (2013) approvingly cites Friedman when explaining how he is understanding suspension of judgment.
McHugh and Nickel both understand “conclusive evidence” in this way. Other fans of Discretion are less clear on what “conclusive evidence” is meant to mean.
Nickel (2010, p. 314).
Verbatim from Nickel (2010, pp. 313–314).
Nickel (2010, p. 314); italics mine.
By “akrasia” I do not mean weakness of will; like Holton (2009), I would distinguish the two. I rather mean acting or forming attitudes in a way that would amount to a failure to correctly respond to reasons if one’s beliefs about the reasons in play were true. So defined, claiming that there is such a thing as epistemic akrasia doesn’t presuppose that we have any kind of control over our attitudes.
Credit goes to an anonymous reviewer for pressing me to talk more explicitly about this objection.
Some prominent level splitters include Lasonen-Aarnio (2010, 2014), Weatherson (Ms) and Williamson (2011). All three are sympathetic to the idea that there is a distinction between justification and some weaker status, though they have different words for that status—“reasonable” in Lasonen-Aarnio’s case, “praiseworthy” in Weatherson’s case (cf. Weatherson (2008)), and “excusable” in Williamson’s case (cf. Williamson (2007) and (2013)).
Admittedly, these requirements are inconsistent with an extreme synchronic intrapersonal permissivism. But I have serious doubts about whether anyone would accept such a view. An interpersonal extreme permissivism might be plausible, and so might a diachronic intrapersonal extreme permissivism. Moreover, as Douven (2009) notes, it might be plausible to hold the counterfactual intrapersonal extreme permissivist claim that one could have had the same evidence at t and been rational in holding an opposite attitude on p at t to the one that one now rationally holds at t had one’s priors been different. But none of these claims conflicts with REQ-1 or REQ-2!
Friedmans (2013, p. 170).
An entertaining example is Jorge Luis Borges, who apparently said: “Being an agnostic means that all things are possible, even god, even the Holy Trinity”; see Shenker (1971).
What about swamp-agnostics? Such agnostics could still be dispositionally responsive to the quality of their evidence in the relevant way, even if—lacking any psychological history—they hadn’t ever reflected on their evidence.
For discussion of this thought that I embrace, see Pryor (2004). Pryor invokes Broome’s notion of a wide scope requirement (though with qualifications about the language of “scope”) to explain these cases. He suggests that even if someone unjustifiably believes that the evidence for p is insufficient, this person would be violating a requirement of rationality if she believed p under these conditions. He also suggests that we should distinguish this notion of rationality from the notion of justification. So this view wouldn’t vindicate a diachronic version of Discretion, since agnosticism here wouldn’t attain the same epistemic status that belief would minus the higher-order doubt. I myself am tempted to say that the person’s evidence ceases to be sufficient here, precisely because this person is not in a position to form a doxastically rational belief.
McHugh (2014) defends such a model. He should rely solely on this model and reject the Argument from Discretion.
Descartes (1641/1996, p. 40).
References
Adler, J. (2002). Belief’s own ethics. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Alston, W. P. (1988). The deontological conception of epistemic justification. Philosophical Perspectives, 2, 259–299.
Ballantyne, N., & Coffman, E. J. (2011). Evidence, uniqueness, and rationality. Philosophers’ Imprint, 11(18).
Bennett, J. (1999). Why is belief involuntary? Analysis, 50(2), 87–107.
Bergmann, M. (2005). Defeaters and higher-level requirements. Philosophical Quarterly, 55, 419–436.
Bommarito, N. (2013). Modesty as a virtue of attention. Philosophical Review, 122, 97–117.
Brennan, J. (2007). Modesty without illusion. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 75, 111–128.
Broome, J. (2013). Rationality through reasoning. Oxford: Blackwell.
Chisholm, R. M. (1966). Theory of knowledge. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.
Chisholm, R. M. (1977). Theory of knowledge (2nd ed.). Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.
Chisholm, R. M. (1982). The foundations of knowing. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Chisholm, R. M. (1988). The evidence of the senses. Philosophical Perspectives, 2, 71–90.
Christensen, D. (2010). Higher-order evidence. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 81, 185–215.
Curley, E.M. (1975). Descartes, spinoza, and the ethics of belief. In M. Mandelbaum & E. Freeman (Eds.), Spinoza: Essays in interpretation (pp. 159–189. LaSalle, Ill: Open Court Publishing.
Descartes, R. (1641/1996). Meditations on first philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Douven, I. (2009). Uniqueness revisted. American Philosophical Quarterly, 46(4), 347–361.
Dretske, F. (1971). Conclusive reasons. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 49, 1–22.
Driver, J. (1989). The virtues of ignorance. Journal of Philosophy, 86, 373–384.
Driver, J. (2000). Moral and epistemic virtue. In G. Axtell (Ed.), Knowledge, belief, and character. Rowman and Littlefield: Lanham.
Elga, A. (2007). Reflection and disagreement. Nous, 41, 478–502.
Feldman, R. (2000). The ethics of belief. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 60, 667–695.
Foley, R. (1993). Working without a net. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Frankish, K. (2007). Deciding to believe again. Mind, 116, 523–547.
Friedman, J. (2013). Suspended judgment. Philosophical Studies, 162(2), 165–181.
Friedman, J. Forthcoming. Rational agnosticism and degrees of belief. Oxford Studies in Epistemology.
Friedman, J. MS. Inquiry and suspension of judgment.
Gibbard, Allan. (2005). Truth and correct belief. Philosophical Issues, 15, 338–350.
Ginet, C. (2001). Deciding to believe. In M. Steup (Ed.), Knowledge, truth, and duty. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hieronymi, Pamela. (2006). Controlling attitudes. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 87(1), 45–74.
Hieronymi, Pamela. (2008). Responsibility for believing. Synthese, 161(3), 357–373.
Holton, R. (2009). Willing, wanting, waiting. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Horowitz, S. (2014). Epistemic Akrasia. Nous, 48(4), 718–744.
James, W. (1896/1979). The will to believe in F. Burkhardt et al. (Eds.) The will to believe and other essays. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Kelly, T. (2010). Peer disagreement and higher-order evidence. In R. Feldman & T. Warfield (Eds.), Disagreement. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kelly, T. (2014). Evidence can be permissive. In M. Steup, J. Turri, & E. Sosa (Eds.), Contemporary debates in epistemology (2nd ed.). Oxford: Blackwell.
Lasonen-Aarnio, M. (2010). Unreasonable knowledge. Philosophical Perspectives, 24, 1–21.
Lasonen-Aarnio, M. (2014). Higher-order evidence and the limits of defeat. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 88(2), 314–345.
McHugh, C. (2013). The illusion of exclusivity. European Journal of Philosophy. (Online First.).
McHugh, C. (2014). Exercising doxastic freedom. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 88, 1–37.
Nelson, M. (2010). We have no positive epistemic duties. Mind, 119, 83–102.
Nickel, P. (2010). Voluntary belief on a reasonable basis. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 81(2), 312–334.
Pryor, J. (2004). What’s wrong with moore’s argument? Philosophical Issues, 14, 349–378.
Raz, J. (1999). Engaging reason. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Ryan, S. (2003). Doxastic compatibilism and the ethics of belief. Philosophical Studies, 114(1), 47–79.
Scott-Kakures, D. (1994). On belief and captivity of the will. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 54, 77–103.
Shah, Nishi. (2003). How truth governs belief. Philosophical Review, 112(4), 447–482.
Shah, Nishi, & Velleman, J. David. (2005). Doxastic deliberation. Philosophical Review, 114(4), 497–534.
Shenker, I. (1971). Borges, a blind writer with insight. The New York Times. Retrieved from: http://www.nytimes.com/books/97/08/31/reviews/borges-insight.html
Steup, M. (2008). Doxastic freedom. Synthese, 161(3), 375–392.
Steup, M. (2012). Belief, control, and intentionality. Synthese, 188(2), 145–163.
Sturgeon, S. (2010). Confidence and coarse-grained attitudes. Oxford studies in epistemology (Vol. 3). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Velleman, J. David. (2000). The aim of belief. In The possibility of practical reason. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Way, J. (2007). Self-knowledge and the limits of transparency. Analysis, 67(3), 223–230.
Weatherson, B. (2008). Deontology and descartes’s demon. Journal of Philosophy, 105(9), 540–569.
Weatherson, B. MS. Do Judgments Screen Evidence?
Wedgwood, Ralph. (2002). The aim of belief. Philosophical Perspectives, 16, 267–297.
White, R. (2005). Epistemic permissiveness. Philosophical Perspectives, 19, 445–459.
Williams, B. (1973). Deciding to believe in problems of the self. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Williamson, T. (2007). On being justified in one’s head. In M. Timmons, J. Greco, & A. Mele (Eds.), Rationality and the good. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Williamson, T. (2011). Improbable knowing. In T. Dougherty (Ed.), Evidentialism and its discontents. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Williamson, T. (2013). Gettier cases in epistemic logic. Inquiry, 56, 1–14.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Sylvan, K. The illusion of discretion. Synthese 193, 1635–1665 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-015-0796-z
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-015-0796-z