Abstract
Some content externalists claim that if C is a theoretical concept and “C” expresses C, then the content of C in a community at a time is determined by how some members of the community at the time—call them “experts”—understand C or use “C”. Thus, when non-expert Chauncey utters “C”, the content of the concept he expresses does not depend entirely on his intrinsic physical properties, contra the claims of content internalism. This paper proposes that “concept” expresses a theoretical concept, such that the externalist’s insights should apply to how we understand claims expressing the view itself and to how we evaluate the arguments alleged to motivate it. With respect to the first, I argue that the content externalist (a) should regard it as unclear at present which proposition her theory expresses, and (b) should take it that content externalism teaches us about our linguistic community rather than about the metaphysical nature of concepts. With respect to the second, I argue that by externalism’s own lights, the famous externalist thought experiments shouldn’t establish content externalism. In conclusion, I suggest that making sense of content externalism requires presupposing internalism.
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Notes
I use small caps (e.g. concept) to indicate that I’m referring to the concept itself and not its referent.
If this exception entails other differences between Ghassan’s actual and counterfactual communities, then those differences apply as well. If they entail differences between actual and counterfactual Ghassan, then we take it that these differences between actual and counterfactual Ghassan don’t explain the differences in their concepts. Rather, those differences are explained by (expert) usage in their communities.
It may be, of course, that one or the other of these concepts (or both) fail to refer in actuality. I’m not supposing that either concept refers in actuality.
The problem discussed here is distinct from the alleged inconsistency between content externalism and self-knowledge without empirical inquiry, at least as Burge conceives of that allegation. (See, e.g., Burge 1988) Burge denies that alleged problem by arguing that one may accurately self-attribute beliefs without knowing which propositions those beliefs express. (Ibid 662) But he accepts that empirical inquiry may be necessary to explicate a belief. The problem here is exactly that we (Ghassan included) don’t know which proposition Ghassan expresses without empirical inquiry. I’ll discuss this difference further in Sect. 6.
If some content externalist would deny that there is some such fact of the matter, she should (at least) explain what she aims to do in proposing a theory of the individuation of concepts. If it turns out that the only way a content externalist may avoid the problem given here is to deny that there is a fact of the matter about the individuation of concepts, this would be both surprising and a redoubtable theoretical cost.
That is, determined or individuated according to the true or most useful theory.
Recall that as Burge has it, medical science in the counterfactual community is underdeveloped: “...no one has ever isolated arthritis as a specific disease, or syndrome of diseases” (1986a, p. 5).
Or, that’s what we should take from the tharthritis thought experiment, anyway. Recall again Burge’s characterization of medical science in the counterfactual community: “...no one has ever isolated arthritis as a specific disease, or syndrome of diseases.” (1986a, p. 5) This determines that they fail to refer to arthritis. If you think otherwise, then you already disagree with the claim against which this paper argues, and I needn’t convince you.
Recall that Burge himself gives us reason to believe this: “...we are not in a position to provide a very rich and detailed account of the nexus of abilities that go into having a concept...” (Burge 2003, p. 518) Thanks to an anonymous referee from this journal for pointing out to me that this quotation is relevant here.
There may be other possible referents of “concept” that would also make CE true, but for brevity and simplicity, I’ll just say “Econcepts”.
I don’t take myself to be making any controversial positive claim about the sort of inquiry required to establish ii. Rather, I claim just that posing thought experiments alone (without, e.g. systematically recording responses to them) does not suffice to justify a claim like ii. I thus take it that it’s unnecessary here to consider philosophical discussions of semantic intuitions, of experts’ semantic judgments vs. lay semantic judgments, and of experimental philosophy of language.
I take these points to be worth making partly because (1) so many believe that the thought experiments did establish content externalism and (2) few think that content externalism requires empirical justification.
I’m grateful to an anonymous referee from this journal for making it clear that this ought to be done.
I’m grateful to an anonymous referee from this journal for raising this objection.
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Acknowledgments
While preparing this paper, I had many helpful conversations with Chauncey Maher, Erin Crawley-Woods, Jim Sias, and Madeleine Engelhardt. All provided encouragement and demanded that I express myself more clearly. Chauncey also read and commented on multiple drafts, helped me work through thought experiments, and even looked over my responses to the referee reports. I’m grateful. I’d also like to thank three anonymous referees from this journal; they provided many detailed comments and many more helpful suggestions.
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Engelhardt, J. What we talk about when we talk about content externalism. Synthese 193, 125–143 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-015-0748-7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-015-0748-7