Abstract
Whether mental properties are identical with neural properties is one of the central questions of contemporary philosophy of mind. Many philosophers agree that even if mental properties are identical with neural properties, the mind-brain identity thesis cannot be established on empirical grounds, but only be vindicated by theoretical philosophical considerations. In his paper ‘When Is a Brain Like the Planet?’, Clark Glymour proposes a causal criterion for local property identifications and claims that this criterion can be used to empirically establish local identities between mental and neural properties. If successful, such an account would settle the debate on the mind-body problem. In this paper, I argue that Glymour’s approach falls short of its aims. The causal criterion which he proposes does not provide a sufficient condition for the local identification of properties. Moreover, his account does not succeed in rendering local mind-brain identities empirically testable. Therefore, the mind-body problem cannot be solved as easily as Glymour assumes.
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Notes
In Kripkean metaphysics, it is metaphysically necessary that gold is the element with the atomic number 79 (Kripke 1972, pp. 123–125). The crucial point in the present context is, however, that if the laws of nature were different, gold (that is, the element with the atomic number 79) could have a density different from 19.3 g/cm\(^{3}\).
It should be noted that if the property of having negative elementary charge was considered rather than the property ofbeing negatively charged, the argument might become problematic. For if electrons are defined as exactly those particles that have negative elementary charge, it is controversial whether or not being an electron and having negative elementary charge are distinct properties. However, the property of being negatively charged, which can be instantiated by various kinds of things other than electrons (such as iron filings or copper wires), is not even locally identical with being an electron.
For instance, there is a strong intuition to the effect that the properties of being a closed straight-sided figure having three sides and being a closed straight-sided figure having three angles are distinct. But these properties have to be classified as identical by the necessary coextensiveness criterion, since it is not possible that something is a closed straight-sided figure having three sides without being a closed straight-sided figure having three angles or vice versa (Sober 1982). This counterexample is controversial, however, because it is not clear whether mathematical properties count as appropriate test cases for criteria of property individuation.
I owe this objection to an anonymous referee.
This problem is structurally akin to the classical problem of trying to refute ceteris paribus laws: whenever a putative counterinstance is found, the law can be immunized against refutation by arguing that this particular counterinstance is excluded by the ceteris paribus condition. Thanks to an anonymous referee for pointing this out.
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Hoffmann-Kolss, V. Of brains and planets: on a causal criterion for mind-brain identities. Synthese 193, 1177–1189 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-015-0671-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-015-0671-y