Abstract
In Wehmeier (J Philos Log 33:607–630, 2004) we are presented with the subjunctive modal language, a way of dealing with the expressive inadequacy of modal logic by marking atomic predicates as being either in the subjunctive or indicative mood. Wehmeier claims that this language is expressively equivalent to the standard actuality language, and that despite this the marked-unmarked dichotomies are not the same in the two languages. In this paper we will attend to Wehmeier’s argument that this is the case, and show that this conclusion rests on what might be considered an uncharitable stipulation concerning what it is for a formula in the actuality language to be true in a model.
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French, R. Expressive power, mood, and actuality. Synthese 190, 1689–1699 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-011-9933-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-011-9933-5