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Multiple Objectives: A Neglected Problem in the Theory of Human Action

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Abstract

The options that people face are rarely ideal: they are good in some ways and poor in others. People have problems choosing among such options because they don’t know which ends to favor. Multiple objectives pose a problem not only for decision makers, but also for our account of decision making. People act to achieve their ends given their beliefs. In order to handle decisions with multiple objectives, however, this story must be supplemented by an account of which ends are implicated in which decisions (e.g., do individual goals guide particular choices? do different ends jointly pick out courses of action?). Unfortunately, such an account is lacking. As a result, there is a gap (at least) in our most basic account of human behavior. In this paper I explore that gap and examine some proposals for closing it.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, University of Oklahoma, 605 Dale Hall Tower, 455 West Lindsey, Norman, OK, 73019, USA

    Stephen Ellis

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  1. Stephen Ellis
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Correspondence to Stephen Ellis.

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Ellis, S. Multiple Objectives: A Neglected Problem in the Theory of Human Action. Synthese 153, 313–338 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-005-5751-y

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