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Young’s axiomatization of the Shapley value: a new proof

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Abstract

We give a new proof of Young’s characterization of the Shapley value. Moreover, as applications of the new proof, we show that Young’s axiomatization of the Shapley value is valid on various well-known subclasses of \(\textit{TU}\) games.

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Notes

  1. In brackets the original, stronger axiom used by Young (1985).

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Mathematics, MTA-BCE “Lendület” Strategic Interactions Research Group, Corvinus University of Budapest, Fővám tér 13-15, Budapest, 1093, Hungary

    Miklós Pintér

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  1. Miklós Pintér
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Correspondence to Miklós Pintér.

Additional information

I thank the AE and the two anonymous referees, Ferenc Forgó, Anna Khmelnitskaya, Zsófia Széna and William Thomson for their suggestions and remarks. Financial support by the Hungarian Scientific Research Fund (OTKA) and the János Bolyai Research Scholarship of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences is also gratefully acknowledged.

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Pintér, M. Young’s axiomatization of the Shapley value: a new proof. Ann Oper Res 235, 665–673 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-015-1859-8

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-015-1859-8

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