Abstract
Classical voting rules assume that ballots are complete preference orders over candidates. However, when the number of candidates is large enough, it is too costly to ask the voters to rank all candidates. We suggest to fix a rank k, to ask all voters to specify their best k candidates, and then to consider “top-k approximations” of rules, which take only into account the top-k candidates of each ballot. The questions are then: Are these k-truncated approximations good predictors of the approximated rule? For which values of k and under which assumptions can we expect to output the correct winner with high probability? For different voting rules, we study these questions theoretically, by giving tight approximation ratios, and empirically, based on randomly generated profiles and on real data. We consider two measures of the quality of the approximation: the probability of selecting the same winner as the original rule, and the score ratio. We do a worst-case study (for the latter measure only), and for both measures, an average-case study and a study from real data sets.
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A more general version of this result was proven by Kruger and Terzopoulou [19].
The original data contains 43,942 ballots and only 3662 are complete.
For the Borda and Harmonic rules, they choose the average approximation, which they call FairCutoff.
It consists of dividing a distribution of data – arranged in the increasing order of their abscissas – into two subgroups of equal size and then calculating a mean point for each of them (the black points in Fig. 11). We draw the line that joins these two points. This line passes through the centre of the scatter plot.
Thus we obtain the correct result with 1400 voters specifying their top candidate (which needs \(1400 \log 12 \approx 3479\) bits to be communicated), or 850 voters specifying their top-2 candidates (which needs \(850 \log (12\times 11) \approx 4150\) bits), or 750 voters specifying their top-3 candidates (which needs \(750 \log (12\times 11 \times 10) \approx 5389\) bits).
Interestingly, [3] give another optimal rule (thus with same worst-case ratio), which is much more complex, and which is not a top-k PSR. Comparing the average ratio of both rules is left for further study.
Moreover, there are several ways of defining the Copeland score, all leading to the same rule. However, this has no impact on the negative result below, as long as a Condorcet loser has score 0.
As Ranked Pairs is not based on scores, it was not studied here. All others rules we considered, including Copeland and maximin, are defined via a score maximization.
For the method used for generating mixtures of Mallows model see the discussion page 11.
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Acknowledgements
We thank the anonymous reviewers for EUMAS-2020 and JAAMAS for their valuable comments. This work was funded in part by the French government under management of Agence Nationale de la Recherche as part of the "Investissements d'avenir" program, reference ANR-19-P3IA-0001 (PRAIRIE 3IA Institute).
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Appendix: ANOVA by Ranks
Appendix: ANOVA by Ranks
The Friedman test [15] known as the Friedman two-way ANalysis Of VAriances by ranks (ANOVA by Ranks) is a non-parametric statistical test. The objective of this test is to determine if we may conclude from a sample of results that there is difference among treatment effects:
where
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b is number of data sets (blocks, rows);
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v is number of treatments (voting rules, columns);
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\(r_i^j\) is the rank of the jth of v rules on the ith of b data sets;
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\(R_j=\frac{1}{b}\sum _{i=1..b} r_i^j\)
The first step in calculating the ANOVA’s test is to convert the original results to ranks. Thus, it ranks the treatments for each problem separately, the best performing treatment should have rank 1, the second best rank 2, etc. In case of ties, average ranks are computed.
Under the null hypothesis (\(H_0\)) — which states that all the treatments behave similarly and thus their ranks \(R_j\) for \(j= \{1,\dots ,v\}\) should be equal — the Friedman statistic is distributed according to \(\chi ^{2}_{F}\) with \(b-1\) degrees of freedom when b and v are big enough (as a rule of a thumb, \(b > 10\) and \(v > 5\)).
Iman and Davenport [17] showed that Friedman’s \(\chi ^{2}_{F}\) presents a conservative behavior and proposed a better statistic which is distributed according to the F-distribution with two degrees of freedom \(v-1\) and \((v-1)\times (b-1)\):
In order to apply the ANOVA’s test to our specific case, let us consider the experimental results illustrated in Fig. 4 (a) when \(m=7, n=15\) and \(\phi =0.8\) presented in Table 1.
Our goal is to compare statistically the behavior of voting rules (columns) for different values of \(k\in \{1,\dots ,5\}\) (rows). In this example, \(b=5\) and \(v = 7\). We compute \(\chi ^{2}_{F}\) and \(F_F\) following Eqs. 1 and 2, respectively as follows:
The Friedman test proves whether the measured average ranks are significantly different from the mean rank \(R_j=(3.8 +3.6 + 6 + 6.8 +4.8 + 1 + 2)/7 = 4\) where \(j\in \{1,\dots ,7\}\) expected under the null hypothesis.
\(F_F\) is distributed according to the F distribution with \(DF1=7-1=6\) and \(DF2=(7-1)\times (5-1)=24\) degrees of freedom. In this example, the null hypothesis is rejected because:
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The critical value (from the table of critical values for the F distribution for use with ANOVA) with 0.05 significance level and (6, 24) degrees of freedom, is 2.508, so the null hypothesis is rejected at a high level of significance since \(F_F= 44.27>> 2.508\).
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The p-value computed by using F(6, 24) distribution is 8.12658E-12, so the null hypothesis is rejected at a high level of significance since 8.12658E-12 \(<< 0.05\)
From the obtained results, we can say that the considered voting rules have a very different behavior.
Table 2 summarizes the results of Friedman test and Iman–Davenport extension for different figures considered in this paper. Results suggest that the null hypothesis is always rejected for all settings which means that the k-truncated voting rules behave differently.
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Ayadi, M., Ben Amor, N. & Lang, J. Approximating voting rules from truncated ballots. Auton Agent Multi-Agent Syst 36, 24 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10458-022-09551-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10458-022-09551-z