Abstract
Approval-based multiwinner voting rules have recently received much attention in the Computational Social Choice literature. Such rules aggregate approval ballots and determine a winning committee of alternatives. To assess effectiveness, we propose to employ new noise models that are specifically tailored for approval votes and committees. These models take as input a ground truth committee and return random approval votes to be thought of as noisy estimates of the ground truth. A minimum robustness requirement for an approval-based multiwinner voting rule is to return the ground truth when applied to profiles with sufficiently many noisy votes. Our results indicate that approval-based multiwinner voting can indeed be robust to reasonable noise. We further refine this finding by presenting a hierarchy of rules in terms of how robust to noise they are.
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Even though it might look as a toy example of a noise model, a more careful look will reveal that \({\mathcal {M}}_p\) can be seen as the analog of the famous Mallows noise model [23] in the classical social choice setting when each voter provides a strict ranking of the alternatives instead of an approval set. Like in the Mallows model, the parameter p is the probability of “getting it right”, i.e., of including in the random set alternatives of the gound truth committee, and leaving out alternatives not belonging to it. Interestingly, the ABCC rule AV turns out to be a maximum likelihood estimator for \({\mathcal {M}}_p\) (analogously to the fact that the well-known Kemeny rule is an MLE for Mallows; e.g., see [31]). As this is beyond the scope of the current paper, we present a proof in “Appendix”.
Viewing sets as binary strings, the distance metric \(d_\varDelta\) is equivalent to the Hamming distance; see Deza and Deza [12].
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Acknowledgements
This research is co-financed by Greece and the European Union (European Social Fund) through the Operational Programme “Human Resources Development, Education and Lifelong Learning 2014-2020” (project MIS 5047146).
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A preliminary version of this paper appeared in Proceedings of the 29th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI), pages 74–80, 2020.
Appendix
Appendix
Theorem 6
The ABCC rule AV is a maximum likelihood estimator for the noise model \({\mathcal {M}}_p\).
Proof
Let \(\varPi =(S_i)_{i\in [n]}\) be a profile with n approval votes. We need to show that the profile \(\varPi\) has maximum probability to have been produced by the noise model \({\mathcal {M}}_p\) with a set of k alternatives of maximum AV score from the votes of \(\varPi\) as the ground truth committee.
Indeed, the probability that \(\varPi\) has been produced by the noise model \({\mathcal {M}}_p\) with ground truth committee U is
Since \(p>1/2\), the above expression is maximized by minimizing the quantity \(\sum _{i\in [n]}{d_\varDelta (S_i,U)}\). Now, we can express this quantity in terms of the number of agents n, the committtee size k, the total size of approval votes in profile \(\varPi\), and the AV score of committee U from the votes of \(\varPi\), using the following derivation:
Hence, the probability that the profile \(\varPi\) is generated by a noise model \({\mathcal {M}}_p\) is maximized for the ground truth committee U of maximum score \({{\,\mathrm{sc}\,}}_{{{\,\mathrm{AV}\,}}}(U,\varPi )\). \(\square\)
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Caragiannis, I., Kaklamanis, C., Karanikolas, N. et al. Evaluating approval-based multiwinner voting in terms of robustness to noise. Auton Agent Multi-Agent Syst 36, 1 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10458-021-09530-w
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10458-021-09530-w