Abstract
In this paper we propose a new method to associate a coalitional game with each strategic game. The method is based on the lower value of finite two-player zero-sum games. We axiomatically characterize this new method, as well as the method that was described in Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944). As an intermediate step, we provide axiomatic characterizations of the value and the lower value of matrix games and finite two-player zero-sum games, respectively.
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The authors acknowledge the financial support of Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnologia, FEDER andXunta de Galicia through projects BEC2002-04102-C02-02 and PGIDIT03PXIC20701PN.We wish to thank Professor William Thomson as well as an anonymous referee for useful comments.
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Carpente, L., Casas-Méndez, B., García-Jurado, I. et al. Values for strategic games in which players cooperate. Int J Game Theory 33, 397–419 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820400176
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820400176