The truncated core for games with upper bounds | International Journal of Game Theory Skip to main content
Log in

The truncated core for games with upper bounds

  • Published:
International Journal of Game Theory Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

We define and study games with upper bounds. In one of these games there are upper bounds on the possible payoffs for some coalitions. These restrictions require adjustments in the definitions of solution concepts. In the current paper we study the effect of the restrictions on the core and define and study the so-called truncated core.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Subscribe and save

Springer+ Basic
¥17,985 /Month
  • Get 10 units per month
  • Download Article/Chapter or eBook
  • 1 Unit = 1 Article or 1 Chapter
  • Cancel anytime
Subscribe now

Buy Now

Price includes VAT (Japan)

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  • Bergantiños G, Vidal-Puga JJ (2007) The optimistic TU game in minimun cost spanning tree problems. Int J Game Theor 36: 223–239

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bird CG (1976) On cost allocation for a spanning tree: a game theoretic approach. Networks 6: 335–350

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bondareva ON (1963) Certain applications of the methods of linear programming to the theory of cooperative games (In Russian). Problemy Kibernet 10: 119–139

    Google Scholar 

  • Branzei R, Dimitrov D, Pickl S, Tijs S (2004) How to cope with division problems under interval uncertainty of claims? Int J Uncertain Fuzz Knowl Based Syst 12: 191–200

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Carpente L, Casas-Méndez B, García-Jurado I, van den Nouweland A (2008) Coalitional interval games for strategic games in which players cooperate. Theor Decis 65: 253–269

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Chun Y (2006) A pessimistic approach to the queueing problem. Math Social Sci 51: 171–181

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Davis M, Maschler M (1965) The kernel of a cooperative game. Nav Res Log Q 12: 223–259

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fernández FR, Hinojosa MA, Puerto J (2002) Core solutions in vector-valued games. J Optim Theor Appl 112/2: 331–360

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Maniquet F (2003) A characterization of the Shapley value in queueing problems. J Econ Theor 109: 90–103

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Peleg B (1986) On the reduced game property and its converse. Int J Game Theor 15: 187–200

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Shapley LS (1953) A value for n-person games. In: Kuhn H, Tucker AW (eds) Contributions to the theory of games II. Princeton University Press, Princeton, pp 307–317

    Google Scholar 

  • Shapley LS (1967) On balanced sets and cores. Nav Res Log Q 14: 453–460

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Voorneveld M, Van den Nouweland A (1998) A new axiomatization of the core of games with transferable utility. Econ Lett 60: 151–155

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Luisa Carpente.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Carpente, L., Casas-Méndez, B., García-Jurado, I. et al. The truncated core for games with upper bounds. Int J Game Theory 39, 645–656 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-009-0205-2

Download citation

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-009-0205-2

Keywords

JEL Classification