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Using elections to represent preferences

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Abstract.

This paper takes voting theory out of the realm of mechanism design and studies elections as tools for representing preferences: every preference relation on a set of n elements is the outcome of pairwise voting by approximately 2 log2 n voters with transitive preferences. Results like this one provide representation for preference relations not representable by utility functions. They also motivate definitions of the levels of intransitivity, nonlinearity and nonrepresentability (by utility function) of a preference relation.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London, Egham, Surrey, TW20 0EX, UK (e-mail: v.knoblauch@rhbnc.ac.uk.), , , , , , GB

    Vicki Knoblauch

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  1. Vicki Knoblauch
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Received: 25 March 1999/Accepted: 19 June 2000

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Knoblauch, V. Using elections to represent preferences. Soc Choice Welfare 18, 823–831 (2001). https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550000088

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550000088

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