Abstract
In the standard epistemic logic, the knowledge operator is represented as a box operator, a universal quantifier over a set of possible worlds. There is an alternative approach to the semantics of knowledge, according to which an agent a knows \(\alpha \) iff a has a reliable (e.g. sensory) evidence that supports \(\alpha \). In this interpretation, knowledge is viewed rather as an existential, i.e. a diamond modality. In this paper, we will propose a formal semantics for substructural logics that allows to model knowledge on the basis of this intuition. The framework is strongly motivated by a similar semantics introduced in [3]. However, as we will argue, our framework overcomes some unintuitive features of the semantics from [3]. Most importantly, knowledge does not distribute over disjunction in our logic.
V. Punčochář—The work on this paper was supported by grant no. 16-07954J of the Czech Science Foundation.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
- 1.
The operation \(\times \) will not be directly used in the semantic conditions determining the support relation. However, its presence and the requirement that the lattice \(\langle A, +, \times \rangle \) is distributive results in the validity of the axiom \((\alpha \wedge (\beta \vee \gamma )) \rightarrow ((\alpha \wedge \beta ) \vee (\alpha \wedge \gamma ))\) that is a part of the system from [3] (the system is formulated below).
- 2.
A two-sided rule of the form \(\varphi // \psi \) means that \(\varphi \) and \(\psi \) are mutually inferable.
- 3.
The logic is paraconsistent in the sense that \((p \wedge \lnot p) \rightarrow q\) is not a derivable formula in the system.
- 4.
In [8] a slightly modified version of this result was proved. In that paper we do not assume commutativity of fusion and distributivity of the lattice. Completeness of a weaker system w.r.t. the resulting class of models was proved.
References
Beall, J., et al.: On the ternary relation and conditionality. J. Philos. Logic 41, 595–612 (2012)
Bílková, M., Majer, O., Peliš, M., Restall, G.: Relevant agents. In: Beklemishev, L., Goranko, V., Shehtman, V. (eds.) Advances in Modal Logic, vol. 8, pp. 22–38. College Publications, London (2010)
Bílková, M., Majer, O., Peliš, M.: Epistemic logics for skeptical agents. J. Logic Comput. 26, 1815–1841 (2016)
Došen, K.: Sequent systems and groupoid models, part 2. Stud. Logica. 48, 41–65 (1989)
Fagin, R., Halpern, J.Y., Moses, Y., Vardi, M.Y.: Reasoning About Knowledge. MIT Press, Cambridge (1995)
Majer, O., Peliš, M.: Epistemic logic with relevant agents. In: Peliš, M. (ed.) The Logica Yearbook 2008, pp. 123–135. College Publications, London (2009)
Mares, E.D.: Relevant Logics. A Philosophical Interpretation. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (2004)
Punčochář, V.: Substructural inquisitive logics. Rev. Symbol. Logic (Under Consideration)
Restall, G.: Information Flow and Relevant Logic. In: Seligman, J., Westerståhl, D. (eds.) Logic, Language, and Computation: The 1994 Moraga Proceedings, pp. 463–477. CSLI Publications, Stanford (1995)
Restall, G.: An Introduction to Substructural Logics. Routledge, London (2000)
Sedlár, I.: Substructural epistemic logics. J. Appl. Non-Class. Logics 25, 256–285 (2015)
van Benthem, J., Fernández-Duque, D., Pacuit, E.: Evidence logic: a new look at neighborhood structures. In: Bolander, T., Bräunder, T., Ghilardi, S., Moss, L. (eds.) Advances in Modal Logic, vol. 9, pp. 97–118. College Publications, London (2012)
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Appendix
Appendix
In the Appendix, we will provide proofs of the results of the paper. For the proof of Theorem 1-(a), see [10]. The proof of 1-(b) is contained in [8].
Proof of Theorem 2: We are proving that \(\mathcal {M}^{i}= \langle A, +, \times , \cdot , 0, 1, C^{i}, V^{i} \rangle \) is an information model, so we have to verify that all conditions from the definition of information models are satisfied. Since \(+\) is union and \(\times \) intersection, it is immediate that \( \langle A, +, \times \rangle \) is a distributive lattice. Since 0 is the empty set, we also immediately get \(0 + a = 0\) and \(0 \cdot a = 0\). The definition of \(\cdot \) leads also directly to its distributivity over union. Moreover, \(\cdot \) is commutative, since Rxyz implies Ryxz.
We will verify that \(1 \cdot a = a\). We have to show that for any upward closed set u it holds that \(L \cdot u = u\). First, assume that \(z \in L \cdot u\). So, there is \(x \in L\) and \(y \in u\) such that Rxyz. Then it holds that \(y \le z\). Since u is upward closed, it follows that \(z \in u\). Second, assume \(z \in u\). Since \(z \le z\), there is some \(x \in L\) such that Rxzz. It follows that \(z \in L \cdot u\).
The conditions related to the compatibility relation can be easily verified. Moreover, since the ordering in \(\mathcal {M}^{i}\) is inclusion, it holds for any atomic formula p that \(V^{i}(p)\) is the principal ideal generated by V(p).
Proof of Theorem 3: We are proving that for every upward closed set of states u it holds that \(u \vDash \alpha \) in \(\mathcal {M}^{i}\) iff for all \(x \in u\), \(x \Vdash \alpha \) in \(\mathcal {M}\). We can proceed by induction on the complexity of \(\alpha \). The case of atomic formulas as well as the constants \(\bot , \top , t\) is straightforward. As the induction hypothesis we assume that the statement holds for some \(\mathcal {L}\)-formulas \(\alpha \) and \(\beta \).
Negation: First, assume that \(u \nvDash \lnot \beta \). Then for some v, \(uC^{i}v\) and \(v \vDash \beta \), i.e. for all \(x \in v\), \(x \Vdash \beta \). Then for some v there are \(y \in u\) and \(z \in v\) such that yCz and \(z \Vdash \beta \). So for some \(y \in u\), \(y \nVdash \lnot \beta \).
Second, assume that for some \(y \in u\), \(y \nVdash \lnot \beta \), i.e. for some z, yCz and \(z \Vdash \beta \). Take \(v =\{ w \in W; z \le w \}\). Then \(uC^{i}v\) and for all \(x \in v\), \(x \Vdash \beta \), i.e. \(v \vDash \beta \). So \(u \nvDash \lnot \beta \).
Implication: First, assume that \(u \nvDash \alpha \rightarrow \beta \). This means that there is an upward closed set v such that \(v \vDash \alpha \) but \(u \cdot v \nvDash \beta \). Then it follows from the induction hypothesis that every state of v supports \(\alpha \) in \(\mathcal {M}\) and there is a state \(z \in u \cdot v\) such that \(z \nVdash \beta \). So, there are \(x \in u\) and \(y \in v\) such that Rxyz. Since \(y \Vdash \alpha \) and \(z \nVdash \beta \), it follows that \(x \nVdash \alpha \rightarrow \beta \).
Second, assume that for some \(x \in u\), \(x \nVdash \alpha \rightarrow \beta \). That means that there are y, z such that Rxyz, and \(y \Vdash \alpha \) and \(z \nVdash \beta \). Let v be the set \(\{ w \in W; y \le w \}\). Then \(z \in u \cdot v\) and it follows that \(u \cdot v \nvDash \beta \). Moreover, \(v \vDash \alpha \), so \(u \nvDash \alpha \rightarrow \beta \).
Conjunctions: The step for the conjunction \(\wedge \) is straightforward. We will show the step for the intentional conjunction&. First, assume that \(u \vDash \alpha \&\beta \). So, there are \(v_1\), \(v_2\) such that \(v_1 \vDash \alpha \), \(v_2 \vDash \beta \), and \(u \subseteq v_1 \cdot v_2\). Take an arbitrary state \(x \in u\). Then \(x \in v_1 \cdot v_2\), which means that there are \(y \in v_1\) (so \(y \Vdash \alpha \)) and \(z \in v_2\) (so \(z \Vdash \beta \)) such that Ryzx. Therefore, \(x \Vdash \alpha \&\beta \).
Second, assume that for every \(x \in u\), \(x \Vdash \alpha \&\beta \). So, for every \(x \in u\), there are \(y, z \in W\) such that \(y \Vdash \alpha \), \(z \Vdash \beta \), and Ryzx. For every \(x \in u\), let us select some y, z with this property and denote them \(y_x\) and \(z_x\). Now we define
Then \(v_1 \vDash \alpha \) and \(v_2 \vDash \beta \). Moreover, \(u \subseteq v_1 \cdot v_2\). It follows that \(u \vDash \alpha \&\beta \).
Disjunction: First, assume that \(u \vDash \alpha \vee \beta \). So, there are \(v_1\), \(v_2\) such that \(v_1 \vDash \alpha \), \(v_2 \vDash \beta \), and \(u \subseteq v_1 \cup v_2\). Take an arbitrary state \(x \in u\). Then \(x \in v_1\) or \(x \in v_2\), so \(x \Vdash \alpha \) or \(x \Vdash \beta \). Therefore, \(x \Vdash \alpha \vee \beta \).
Second, assume that for every \(x \in u\), \(x \Vdash \alpha \vee \beta \). So, for every \(x \in u\), \(x \Vdash \alpha \) or \(x \Vdash \beta \). Take \(v_1 = || \alpha ||_{\mathcal {M}}\) and \(v_2 = || \beta ||_{\mathcal {M}}\). Then \(v_1 \vDash \alpha \) and \(v_2 \vDash \beta \). Moreover, \(u \subseteq v_1 \cup v_2\). It follows that \(u \vDash \alpha \vee \beta \).
Proof of Theorem 4: To show that \(\mathcal {N}_{\lambda }^K\) is an epistemic information model we have to verify the conditions (a)–(c) from Definition 8 which is straightforward. We will show the inductive step for K in the proof of the claim that \(\varDelta \vDash \alpha \) iff \(\alpha \in \varDelta \). Assume that the claim holds for some \(\mathcal {L}_K\)-formula \(\beta \). We have to prove that \(K\beta \in \varDelta \) iff there is a \(\lambda \)-theory \(\varGamma \) such that \(\varGamma S_{\lambda } \varDelta \) and \(\beta \in \varGamma \).
First, assume that there is a \(\lambda \)-theory \(\varGamma \) such that \(\varGamma S_{\lambda } \varDelta \) and \(\beta \in \varGamma \). Then we have directly from the definition of \(S_{\lambda }\) that \(K\beta \in \varDelta \).
Second, assume \(K\beta \in \varDelta \). We define \(\varGamma = \{ \gamma ; \beta \rightarrow \gamma \in \lambda \}\). \(\varGamma \) is a \(\lambda \)-theory, due to the application of the rules: \(\beta \rightarrow \gamma , \gamma \rightarrow \delta /\beta \rightarrow \delta \) and \(\beta \rightarrow \delta , \beta \rightarrow \epsilon /\beta \rightarrow (\delta \wedge \epsilon )\). Moreover, due to the axiom \(\beta \rightarrow \beta \), \(\beta \in \varGamma \). Now, it will suffice to prove that \(\varGamma S_{\lambda } \varDelta \). Assume that \(\gamma \in \varGamma \), i.e. \(\beta \rightarrow \gamma \in \lambda \). Then \(K \beta \rightarrow K \gamma \in \lambda \) due to R1. Since \(K \beta \in \varDelta \), then also \(K \gamma \in \varDelta \), since \(\varDelta \) is a \(\lambda \)-theory.
Proof of Theorem 5: Proving soundness is a matter of a mechanical verification of the respective axioms in the respective class of models. We will discuss only completeness. (a) is a consequence of Theorem 4. To prove (b), we have to show that the canonical model of \(\lambda =\lambda ^{K}_{1}\) is intended, i.e. it holds: if \(\varDelta S_{\lambda } \varGamma \), then \(\varDelta \subseteq \varGamma \). Assume that \(\varDelta S_{\lambda } \varGamma \) and \(\alpha \in \varDelta \). Then \(K \alpha \in \varGamma \) and since we assume that \(K \alpha \rightarrow \alpha \in \lambda \), we have \(\alpha \in \varGamma \).
To prove (c), we have to show that the canonical model of \(\lambda =\lambda ^{K}_{12}\) is strong. So we have to verify that in that case if \(\varDelta S_{\lambda } \varGamma \) and \(\varGamma \ne \mathcal {L}_K\), then \(\varDelta C \varGamma \). Assume \(\varDelta S_{\lambda } \varGamma \) and \(\varGamma \ne \mathcal {L}_K\). For the contradiction, assume that it does not hold that \(\varDelta C \varGamma \). Then it also does not hold that \(\varGamma C \varDelta \), so there is an \(\mathcal {L}_K\)-formula \(\alpha \) such that \(\lnot \alpha \in \varGamma \) and \(\alpha \in \varDelta \). Then \(K \alpha \in \varGamma \), and since we assume A2, it follows \(\bot \in \varGamma \). Then \(\varGamma = \mathcal {L}_K\), which is a contradiction. The proof of (d) is similar.
Proof of Theorem 6: Let a be a state of a model on a source-distributive epistemic information frame and let \(\alpha \) be any \(\mathcal {L}_K\)-formula. Assume that \(a \vDash K(\alpha \vee \beta )\). Then there is some \(b \in S(a)\) such that \(b \vDash \alpha \vee \beta \). So, there are c, d such that \(c \vDash \alpha \), \(d \vDash \beta \), and \(b \le c + d\). It follows that \((c+d)Sa\). Since the model is on a source-distributive frame, there are \(c'\), \(d'\) such that \(cSc'\), \(dSd'\), and \(a \le c' + d'\). Then \(c' \vDash K \alpha \) and \(d' \vDash K \beta \), and, as a consequence, \(a \vDash K \alpha \vee K \beta \).
We have proved that A3 is valid in every model on any source-distributive epistemic information frame. Now consider an arbitrary epistemic information model on a frame that is not source-distributive. So, there are some states a, b, c such that \((a+b)Sc\) and there are no d, e such that aSd, bSe, and \(c \le d+e\). Define a valuation V on the model in such a way that \(V(p)=\{d; d \le a\}\) and \(V(q)=\{e ; e \le b \}\). It holds that \(a+b \vDash p \vee q\), so \(c \vDash K(p \vee q)\). We want to show that \(c \nvDash Kp \vee Kq\). For the sake of contradiction, assume that \(c \vDash Kp \vee Kq\). Then there are d, e such that \(d \vDash Kp\), \(e \vDash Kq\), and \(c \le d + e\). But then there are \(d' \in S(d)\) and \(e' \in S(e)\) such that \(d' \vDash p\) and \(e' \vDash q\). It follows that aSd and bSe, which is in contradiction with our assumption.
Proof of Theorem 7: This result is an extension of Theorem 2. We have to verify that \(\mathcal {D}^{i}\) satisfies the conditions (a)–(e) from Definition 8 and the condition from Definition 11. The conditions (a)–(c) are quite straightforward. To prove (e), we have to show that if \(uS^{i}v\), then \(v \subseteq u\). So, assume that \(uS^{i}v\) and \(x \in v\). Then there is \(y \in u\) such that ySx. But then \(y \le x\), and so \(x \in u\), which is what we wanted to show. Now we will show that \(\mathcal {D}^{i}\) is source distributive. Assume \((u \cup v)S^{i}w\). Let us define
Both \(u'\) and \(v'\) are upward closed. Moreover, \(uS^{i}u'\), \(vS^{i}v'\), and \(w \subseteq u' \cup v'\).
Proof of Theorem 8: This result is an extension of Theorem 3. So, we are proving that for every upward closed set of states u it holds that \(u \vDash \alpha \) in \(\mathcal {D}^{i}\) iff for all \(x \in u\), \(x \Vdash \alpha \) in \(\mathcal {D}\), and we have to show the inductive step for K. Assume that the statement holds for some \(\mathcal {L}_K\)-formula \(\beta \). First, assume that \(u \vDash K\beta \) in \(\mathcal {D}^{i}\). So, there is \(v \in S^{i}(u)\) such that \(v \vDash \beta \). Then for every \(x \in u\) there is some \(y \in v\) such that ySx, and for every \(y \in v\), \(y \Vdash \beta \). Therefore, for every \(x \in u\) there is y such that ySx, and \(y \Vdash \beta \), that is, for every \(x \in u\), \(x \Vdash K \beta \).
Second, suppose for every \(x \in u\), \(x \Vdash K \beta \), that is, for every \(x \in u\) there is \(x'\) such that \(x'Sx\), and \(x' \Vdash \beta \). Define \(v = \{z ;\) there is \(x \in u\) such that \(x' \le z\)}. Obviously, v is upward closed, and for all \(z \in v\), \(z \Vdash \beta \). Moreover, for every \(x \in u\) there is \(z \in v\) (namely \(x'\)) such that zSx. It follows that there is v such that \(vS^{i}u\) and \(v \vDash \beta \). Therefore, \(u \vDash K \beta \) in \(\mathcal {D}^{i}\).
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2017 Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany
About this paper
Cite this paper
Punčochář, V. (2017). Knowledge Is a Diamond. In: Kennedy, J., de Queiroz, R. (eds) Logic, Language, Information, and Computation. WoLLIC 2017. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 10388. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-55386-2_22
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-55386-2_22
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-662-55385-5
Online ISBN: 978-3-662-55386-2
eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)