Abstract
The paper presents an enhancement of univariate Differential Power Analysis (DPA), referred to as Probable Key Differential Power Analysis (PKDPA). The proposed analysis uses the standard Difference of Means (DoM) test as the distinguisher and employs its enhancement strategy to reduce the number of power traces required to mount the attack. Theoretical analysis for the developed attack has been furnished to justify the efficiency of the proposed attack in retrieving the key using significantly less number of traces compared to conventional DPA attacks. The theoretical claims have been supported by extensive experiments on real life attacks mounted on Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) implementations of the Data Encryption Standard (DES), Triple-DES (3-DES) and the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). The efficacy of the proposed method is further proved by attacking a masked implementation of AES using only 13,000 power traces.
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Saha, D., Mukhopadhyay, D., RoyChowdhury, D. (2011). PKDPA: An Enhanced Probabilistic Differential Power Attack Methodology. In: Bernstein, D.J., Chatterjee, S. (eds) Progress in Cryptology – INDOCRYPT 2011. INDOCRYPT 2011. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7107. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-25578-6_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-25578-6_3
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