Abstract
A social norm is a behavior that emerges as a convention within society without any direction from a central authority. Social norms emerge as repeated interactions between individuals give rise to biases toward actions or behaviors which spread through the society until one behavior is adapted as the default behavior, even when multiple acceptable behaviors exist. Of particular interest to us is how and when norms emerge in social networks, which provide a framework for individuals to interact routinely. We study how quickly norms converge in social networks depending on parameters such as the topology of the network, population size, neighborhood size, and number of behavior alternatives. Our research can be used to model and analyze popular social networks on the Internet such as Facebook, Flickr, and Digg. In addition, it can be used to predict how norms emerge and spread in human societies, ranging from routine decisions like which side of the road to drive on to social trends such as the green phenomenon.
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Sen, O., Sen, S. (2010). Effects of Social Network Topology and Options on Norm Emergence. In: Padget, J., et al. Coordination, Organizations, Institutions and Norms in Agent Systems V. COIN 2009. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 6069. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-14962-7_14
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-14962-7_14
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